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I. INTRODUCTION 
The term "equity" is often misunderstood and, as a consequence, 
often misapplied by courts when asked to grant an equitable remedy. 
In abroad jurispmdential sense, equity means the power to do justice 
in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the rigidity of 
strict legal mles. In this broad sense, equity means the power to adapt 
the relief to the circumstances of the particular case, "individualized 
justice," in effect. However, equity jurispmdence is not an open-
ended system of boundless discretion vested in a single judge. 
Professor Zechariah Chafee, one of the leading writers on equity, once 
remarked in the context of a court sitting in equity, "0, it is excellent 
[t]o have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous [t]o use it like a 
giant."l In more prosaic terms, equity is not a roving commission that 
empowers a judge to dispense his or her own brand of justice in a 
particular case as he or she sees fit. The Michigan Supreme Court 
made this very point some 35 years ago: 
[N] 0 court of chancery would consciously attempt to correct 
the severity of the law, or to supply its defects, to any extent 
or under any circumstances, "beyond the already-settled 
principles of equity jurispmdence." Of course this is true. 
No one has ever suggested, so far as our reports disclose, that 
'" Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. J.D. 
1977, Wayne State University Law School; LLM. 1982, Harvard Law School. 
1. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,jR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUI1Y 303 (1950). 
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any chancellor of Michigan should step beyond or over the 
settled principles of equity.2 
All writers on the subject of equity, regardless of their philosophi-
cal persuasion, agree that the terms "equity" and "equitable" are 
difficult to define. The loose use of the terms "equity" and "equitable" 
to mean "fair," "compassionate," and "flexible" has resulted in 
decisions by equity courts whose rationale remains hidden when 
"equity" is offered as the reason for the decision. For a court to say 
that it has decided to relieve a party from a contract because the 
bargain was too hard and rest that decision on the ground of "equity" 
says nothing about equitable principles, equitable precedents, or 
equitable remedies. A decision that rests solely on "equity" is an 
analytically naked, and analytically suspect, decision. It is a decision 
that rests on nothing more than the judge's subjective feelings of what 
is fair under the circumstances. While one of the hallmarks of equity 
is its flexibility, it is a flexibility that is exercised against a backdrop of 
specific rules on fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress, undue 
influence, unreasonable delay, and estoppel. 
In Anglo-American law equity means the system of distinctive 
concepts, doctrines, rules, and remedies developed and applied by the 
court of Chancery in England and by American courts sitting in 
equity. In short, "equity" and "equitable" refer to the whole body of 
equitable precedent and practice which lawyers and judges can only 
understand once they know such precedent and practice. Thus, for 
example, when an equity court grants an equitable remedy, that term 
has a precise meaning. It refers to a remedy such as an injunction, an 
order reforming a contract, an order rescinding a contract, or an 
order requiring specific performance of a contract. To gain a better 
appreciation of modem equity, a helpful start would be to review the 
origins of equity. 
II. WHAT ARE THE ORIGINS OF EQUI1Y? 
Two systems of courts once existed in Anglo-American law. One 
court system was the law courts presided over by judges. The other 
court system was the equity court presided over by the Chancellor. 
The Chancellor, who was a high minister of the king and often a 
bishop of the church, invented a body of substantive rules and 
remedies which in effect (but not in theory) could trump the 
decisions of the law courts. In attempting to define "equity," most 
commentators provide an historical answer-which is in effect no 
answer-that equity is the system of jurisprudence originally adminis-
2. Spoon-Shacket Co. v. Oakland County, 97 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Mich. 1959) 
(citation omitted). 
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tered by the High Court of Chancery in England and now adminis-
tered in courts of this country having equity jurisdiction. Even today 
with the merger of the two court systems into a single court of general 
jurisdiction in Michigan3 and in federal and most other state courts, 
lawyers and judges still speak of "legal" remedies, meaning those 
traditionally administered by the law courts, and "equitable" remedies, 
meaning those remedies available in an equity court. 
In that light, equity is a system of jurisprudence that originated 
and developed outside the common law courts of England to furnish 
plaintiffs a remedy not available in the common law courts. The law 
courts of England derived their power directly from the king. In 
order to bring a complaint before the law courts, a plaintiff would 
purchase a writ from the Chancellor (today's equivalent of the Prime 
Minister), which was then presented to the law courts. The law courts 
in turn had the responsibility of hearing the case and granting the 
appropriate relief. Where a new fact situation arose, the Chancellor 
provided a new writ. The issuance of a new writ tended to expand 
national power at the expense of local power.4 The lords objected to 
this development. 
Over time, the system for dispensing justice in the law courts 
ossified. This hardening was attributable in large part to a 1258 
prohibition issued to the Chancellor in the Provisions of Oxford 
directing the Chancellor not to issue new writs to meet new situations 
without the consent of the king and his council. As England moved 
from an agrarian to a commercial economy, the pace of economic 
development overtook the legal system's ability to provide new writs, 
together with new remedies, to meet new situations.5 
The upshot was that as new situations arose, it became common 
to petition the king, through his Chancellor, for relief, invoking the 
king's arbitrary power to do good and dispense justice. The Chancel-
lor was a powerful man whose decisions were as much political as they 
were judicial. The Chancellor eventually developed some specific 
rules for specific situations, but many persons criticized equity as a 
lawless thing where only the Chancellor's discretion mattered and for 
which there was no law by which to measure a person's rights or 
entitlements. As a bishop of the church, the Chancellor often relied 
on appeals to conscience, which of course offered little guidance to 
3. See MICH. Cr. R. 2.101, which provides: "There is one form of action known 
as a 'civil action'." This simple rule, modeled after Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, abolishes the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity 
and merges the two court systems in Michigan. See generalf:y CHARLES A. WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACfICE & PROCEDURE § 1041 (1987). 
4. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 2.2, at 58 (2d ed. 1993). 
5. fd. at 59-66. 
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petItIoners. Equity in its early days was indeed a "roguish thing."6 
The Chancellor gradually became a judicial officer and his 
department, the Chancery, a court for dispensing remedies not 
available in the law courts. The remedies available in the courts oflaw 
had narrowed. Relief was inevitably retrospective and in the form of 
damages. No prospective relief of any kind was available. For 
example, reformation of contracts for mutual mistake was not 
available. The contract either was enforced as written or was 
completely invalidated. 
As the number of appeals to the king grew, so too did the court 
of Chancery. The court of Chancery rose to the meet the exigencies 
of the day by providing preventive (injunctive) relief and specific 
relief. That this court was attempting to do "equity," that is to 
accomplishjustice, gave rise to the term "equity" as the designation for 
the system of jurisprudence involved, and the court that dispensed it 
as a court of equity. In court systems such as Michigan's that have 
merged legal and equitable procedure into one form of civil action in 
a single court with both legal and equitable powers, the term "a court 
of equity" means the merged court exercising its equity powers. 
Over time, law courts were perceived as being "writ-bound." The 
effect was that the less rigid equity courts became increasingly popular 
with litigants. A rivalry soon developed between the law courts and 
chancery,7 reaching a point where the two court systems often issued 
contradictory rulings in the same matter.8 This state of affairs finally 
came to a head in the seventeenth century when King James I ordered 
the Lord Chancellor Ellesmere and the Lord Chief Justice Coke to 
submit their dispute to the Attorney General, Sir Francis Bacon.9 The 
crux of the dispute was that Coke attempted to prohibit the Chancel-
lor, Ellesmere, from enjoining enforcement of judgments rendered by 
the law courts. King James I, an autocrat of the highest order, 
naturally favored his Chancellor over the Chief Justice, much to the 
contrary, Coke was a supporter of Parliament and believed that the 
King was subject to common law. To no one's great surprise, Bacon 
recommended that, in the event of a conflict, equity should prevail. 10 
The King accepted Bacon's recommendation, and the attractiveness 
of equity has persisted ever since. 
6. Id. at 61 (quotingJ. Selden, Table Talk (Pollock Ed. 1927». 
7. John J. Farley, III, Rabin Hood Jurisprudence: The Triumph of Equity in American 
Tort Law, 65 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 997,1001 (1991). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See John P. Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery 
in 1616, 36 ILL. L. REv. 127, 137 n.43 (1941). 
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A. When a Court is Asked to Grant Equitable Relief, What Factors Guide 
the Court in the Exercise of Its Discretion? 
During the period of its greatest development, Chancery viewed 
the chief function of equity as a vehicle for mitigating the harshness 
and smoothing the rough edges of the common law in those cases 
where the Chancellor believed that such mitigation was required by 
conscience or natural law. From equity's earliest days, one can find 
biting criticisms about the flexibility of equity, probably the most 
famous of these being John Selden's indictment that the chancellor's 
conscience varied with the length of his foot. In a similar vein in this 
country many years later, Chief Justice Fuller was quoted as saying, 
"Brother B. would codify all laws in an act of two sections: 1st, All 
people must be good; 2d, Courts of equity are hereb~ given full power 
and authority to enforce the provisions of this act." 1 
Many commentators would argue that even in Selden's day the 
criticisms of equity courts were probably overblown. In any event, 
Selden's and Fuller's shaft eventually went home, but the message 
reached the brain of the beast only after years and years of equity 
decisions. Their criticisms are clearly inaccurate today. The develop-
ment of a court system with unbridled discretion would have been 
intolerable in any free society such as the United States, and no court 
of equity would have survived had it exercised the kind of unfettered, 
free-wheeling power of which Selden and Fuller complained. Even in 
the early days of equity's development, a court of equity did not 
exercise unfettered discretion. The equity courts insisted on citation 
of legal authorities. In that sense, "equitable" referred simply to the 
body or precedent and practice of equity courts and the remedies 
administered by those courts, and not to some vague, subjective 
notion of fairness, morality, or justice. 
The single most important characteristic of equitable relief to 
emerge as the system of equity developed was-and to this day still 
is-that such relief is deemed extraordinary, not ordinary. The first 
corollary to this axiom is that equitable relief was, and is, considered 
a matter of judicial discretion, not a matter of right. Thus, a party 
who sought equitable relief could not demand it as a matter of right 
simply upon a showing of specific facts that would fit the case into one 
for equitable relief. This is what commentators mean when they say 
that granting or denying equitable relief is within the discretion of the 
court. They do not mean that the court has the power to grant 
equitable relief in every type of case presented as the spirit moves the 
11. Charles Nobel Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARv. L. REv. 487, 510 
(1898). 
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judge; rather, what they mean is that parties who have placed their 
case within the category of cases traditionally qualifying for equitable 
relief were not automatically entitled to it. Parties could not demand 
equitable relief; to the contrary, they always requested it. And parties 
who successfully made a case for equitable relief-showed that theirs 
was the type of case where equitable relief had been granted in past 
cases-still had to invoke the discretion of the court to grant such 
relief. 
In a democratic society, this brand of seemingly unfettered 
discretion vested in a single person does not sit well. Can it be the 
case that a single judicial officer has the power to grant or withhold 
equitable relief as the spirit moves him? The short answer is, of 
course, a resounding "no." A more complete explanation requires an 
examination of what the term "discretion" means in the context of 
equity. 
B. In the Context of Equity, 'What Does ''Discretion'' Mean? 
Before turning to a discussion of what "discretion" means in the 
equity context, it is important to be clear on what the term "discre-
tion" does not mean. "Discretion" does not include the judge's mere 
personal discretion. The term "discretion" when used in the context 
of equitable relief does not mean unfettered, unbridled discretion to 
do what the judge feels is best. What discretion does mean in this 
context, however, is PRINCIPLED DISCRETION. Principled discretion is the 
guiding principle for any judge asked to grant equitable relief. 
Although courts of equity are often regarded as courts of good 
conscience, they may not grant equitable relief in the absence of 
either a statute authorizing such relief or a clear precedent establish-
ing a right to the relief requested. Indeed, when exercising discretion 
in the grant or denial of equitable relief, discretion refers to the 
judge's sound judicial discretion, a limited discretion. As explained by 
Professor Henry McClintock in his treatise on equity, this means that 
the judge consults precedent to find the principles that are applicable 
to a particular situation, and then determines, from all the facts of the 
case, what relief will best give effect to the principles involved.12 
Professor Karl Llewellyn perhaps said it best when he observed that 
the decisions of equity judges should have "reasoned regularity.,,13 
In exercising judicial discretion, as opposed to personal discretion, 
courts apply established principles of equity to the facts presented by 
the particular case. 
12. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, MCCLINTOCK ON EQUITY 51-52 (2d ed. 1948). 
13. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 216 
(1960). 
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Beyond fundamental common law principles of deciding like 
cases in a like manner based on precedent, there is also a serious due 
process consideration that an equity court must factor into its 
decision-making process. As noted by the 4th Circuit in Mattison v. 
Dallas Carrier Corp.I4: 
The first principle of due process embraces a rule of law 
which contains standards that can be known in advance, 
conformed to, and applied rationally. The doctrine of the 
supremacy of law is "a doctrine that the sovereign and all its 
agencies are bound to act upon principles, not according to 
arbitrary will; are obliged to follow reason instead of being 
free to follow caprice."15 
Professor Dan Dobbs has made similar observations regarding the 
role of discretion in equity: 
The chancellor's discretion to deny relief is a peculiar 
tradition to encounter in a democratic society where citizens 
possess rights under the law, not merely the hope of indul-
gence .... 
Few American citizens, however, would think of them-
selves in court as humble petitioners, on their knees before 
the judge who may deny relief on grounds that cannot be 
stated as principles or applied even-handedly to all suitors. 16 
Can the exercise of discretion by a judicial officer be reconciled 
with the concept that we hold as fundamental that we are a society 
whose members have rights under law? Only if the judge exercising 
that discretion is very wise, and the range of discretion is very narrowly 
circumscribed. Adherence to precedent and to the principles of 
equity will prevent courts from legislating through the exercise of 
equitable powers and will force them to reach decisions that have 
reasoned regularity.I7 
C. Why Shouldn't a Judge Reach a Decision That He Sincerely Believes is 
Fair, Moral, and Just? 
Why in all cases involving the exercise of equitable powers 
shouldn't a judge reach a decision that he sincerely believes is fair, 
moral, and just-in other words equitable-under the circumstances? 
A system of justice that permits an equity court to dispense justice as 
it sees fit in a given case without the constraints of legal rules and 
14. 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991). 
15. Id. at 101 (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 183 
(1963». 
16. !DOBBS, supra note 4, § 2.4(7), at 115. 
17. See GEORGE KEETON,JUDGING 112 (1990). 
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principles allows courts to decide cases as their biases and attitudes 
dictate, without analysis and without law. While it is true that judges 
do not generally act in bad faith, judges are not free to act without 
stated reasons. Without reliance on guidelines and meaningful rules, 
judges who instead reach decisions based merely on their intuitive feel 
of what the right thing to do is in a case will leave lawyers at a loss 
about the proper evidence to introduce and the legal arguments to 
make, one of the main advantages of rules and principles. More 
importantly, in a system of unlimited discretion judges do not have to 
explain themselves, either as to how they reached their decision or in 
public justification for what they do. By hiding the process of judging 
from public scrutiny under the rubric of "discretion," no member of 
the public or the legal profession can evaluate the judge. Unlimited 
discretion makes possible decisions that are devoid of analysis, 
decisions that are neither explained nor thoughtful. In this connec-
tion it is well worth keeping in mind the origins of equity: Equity 
originated in a society where authority counted more than democracy, 
and where the wishes of the powerful counted more than sound 
explanations for judicial action. That society is not the one within 
which an equity court operates today. 
When commentators and courts speak of the discretion of an 
equity court, they are not referring to the broad discretion of a 
common law court in the many matters committed to the judge's 
discretion in the course of a trial and which can only be reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. The discretion of an equity court to grant or 
refuse equitable relief is regulated by well-settled principles. As a 
consequence, in the setting of equity, the standard of appellate review 
is far less deferential and is usually de novo.I8 
III. WHAT ARE THE ESTABUSHED PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF EQUI1Y? 
Equity developed a number of substantive maxims. I9 The 
18. See Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 
1982); See also Attorney General v. Ankersen, 385 N.W.2d 658 (Mich. 1986). 
19. The maxims have been formulated in different ways by different authors. 
This monograph deals with nine of the maxims that have been discussed in the 
Michigan case law. In his treatise, INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY, George Keeton lists 
fourteen maxims of equity: 1. Equity does not suffer a wrong without a remedy. 2. 
Equity regards substance rather than form. 3. Equity regards as done that which 
ought to be done. 4. Equality is equity. 5. Where the equities are equal, the first in 
time will prevail. 6. Where the equities are equal, the law will prevail. 7. Equity 
follows the law. 8. One who comes into equity must come with clean hands. 9. One 
who seeks equity must do equity. 10. Equity aids the vigilant not those who sleep on 
their rights. 11. Delay defeats equity. 12. Equitable remedies are given as a matter 
of grace or discretion, not right. 13. Equity acts in personam, not in rem. GEORGE 
KEETON, INTRODUCTION TO EQUIlY 87-117 (6th ed. 1965). 
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maxims of equity are short statements or rules of thumb that guide 
courts of equity in the exercise of their sound judicial discretion.2o 
It would be a serious mistake, however, to place too much reliance on 
them as ultimate guides to decision. Their brevity makes them easy 
to remember, but their generality and lack of focus at the same time 
give them limited utility as judicial guides. Indeed, it is this brevity 
and generality that make them potentially dangerous as tools for 
reaching decisions if overreliance is placed on them. 
It is frequently true that the maxims of equity are not very useful 
analytical tools. Take for example, the maxim, "Equity follows the 
law." This maxim states a truism and beyond that, little more. It is 
obviously true that a court sitting in equity cannot depart from 
substantive rules of law when rendering a decision. The Michigan 
Supreme Court, in Blunt v. Brown,21 made this very point regarding 
the limits of equitable relief: "A court of equity will not relieve a party 
from the [legal] consequences of a risk which he voluntarily as-
sumes.,,22 
A judge should not be seduced or distracted by the charming 
tone of equitable maxims. They may be pleasing to the ear, but they 
are not to be taken too literally because they lack precision and 
analytical value.23 They are meant to be illustrative, not dispositive. 
A court, when asked to grant equitable relief, cannot depart from the 
substantive law by relying on an ancient maxim of equity, any more 
than a court of law can depart from statute or precedent when asked 
to resolve a dispute. Only after the underlying principles that these 
maxims represent have been mastered can these maxims then serve 
the purpose for which they were intended, namely, useful shorthand 
devices for jogging one's memory, and not a substitute for principled 
and thoughtful decision making. 
The following are nine equitable maxims invoked in Michigan 
case law. The first four equitable maxim spring from a common 
source. Their shared goals are, first, to ensure that a court sitting in 
equity is not made an instrument of sharp practice and, second, to 
prevent one party's unjust enrichment at the expense of another 
party. 
A. Equity Regards as Done Which Ought to be Done 
This first maxim finds its source in the doctrine of equitable 
20. For a discussion of the equitable maxims, see 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 2.3(4). 
21. 37 N.W.2d 671 (Mich. 1949). 
22. Id. at 673 (citing McCredie v. Buxton, 31 Mich. 383, 388 (1875». 
23. For a criticism of equitable maxims, see Zechariah Chafee, Coming into Equity 
ltJith Clean Hands, 47 MICH. L. REv. 1065, 1092 (1949). 
HeinOnline -- 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 618 1996-1997
618 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74: 609 
estoppel, discussed below. Illustrative is Kent v. Klein,24 where the 
Michigan Supreme Court imposed a constructive trust on property 
given by a mother to her daughter for the benefit of her incompetent 
son, the defendant's brother. The Court observed: 
[C] hancery will not permit one to enrich himself at the 
expense of another by closing its eyes to what is clear to the 
rest of mankind. Equity, to paraphrase, regards that as seen 
which ought to be seen, and, having so seen, as done that 
which ought to be done .... 
It is enough, to compel the surrender [of the property] , 
that one feed and grow fat on that which in good conscience 
belongs to another, that he enjoy a windfall resulting in his 
unjust enrichment, that he reap a profit in a situation where 
honor itself furnishes rich reward .... 25 
B. Equity Looks to the Intent, Rather Than to the Form 
Illustrative is Charles E. Austin, Inc. v. KeUy.26 There, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court disregarded the distinct corporate form of two 
entities that had common ownership where the two corporations were 
created as devices to violate and evade state tax law.27 
C. He "'Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity 
This maxim of equity simply means that a plaintiff who seeks 
equitable relief must be prepared to return the defendant to the status 
quo ante, or be barred from such relief. Where the plaintiff is unable 
to restore the defendant to the status quo ante, rescission or cancella-
tion of an agreement will be denied. This maxim-which is designed 
to prevent the u~ust enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the 
defendant-has found expression in several reported Michigan cases. 
Most of these deal with quiet title actions, foreclosure actions, and 
suits for rescission of contracts induced by defendant's fraud. 
Illustrative are Grabendike v. Adix,28 and Michigan Mobile Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Bank of the Commonwealth.29 In Grabendike, the plaintiffs 
delayed in seeking rescission of mineral leases until after the leased 
property proved to have no oil. The value of the leases was thus 
drastically reduced. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the 
plaintiffs' request for rescission of the leases because the plaintiffs 
24. 91 N.W.2d 11 (Mich. 1958). 
25. [d. at 13-14. See also Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 161 N.W.2d 133 (1968). 
26. 32 N.W.2d 694, cm. denied, 335 U.S. 828 (1948). 
27. [d. at 697. ACCQTd Duro Steel Products, Inc. v. Neubrecht, 6 N.W.2d 474, 476 
(Mich. 1942). 
28. 55 N.W.2d 761 (Mich. 1952). 
29. 223 N.W.2d 725 (Mich. 1974). 
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could not restore to defendant the leases 'with the same value they had 
as when the plaintiffs received them, stating: 
The mere inability of the plaintiff to make restoration does 
not relieve him of his obligation to do so, or permit the 
court to grant him relief .... 
Where the circumstances of the case are such that the 
parties cannot be placed in substantially the same situations 
they occupied when the contract was made, as a general rule 
a court of equity will not rescind the contract .... 30 
In the Michigan Mobile Homeowners Ass'n decision, the plaintiffs 
sought rescission of installment purchase contracts that provided for 
an allegedly usurious rate of interest. The Michigan Court of Appeals 
refused to rescind the sales contracts because, inter alia, the plaintiffs 
had failed to do equity, namely, tender the unpaid balance plus 
interest at the legal rate.31 
D. He Who Comes Into Equity Must Come With Clean Hands 
The "clean hands" maxim, together with the doctrine of laches 
and estoppel (both of which are discussed below), is one of the three 
principal defenses to requests for equitable relief. The clean hands 
ma."'(im is most often cited in contract cases.32 It requires that 
plaintiffs seeking equitable relief must themselves be free of any 
unconscionable conduct. Application of the maxim is thus not 
restricted to illegal, void, or voidable transactions only.33 At the 
other end of the misconduct spectrum, however, mere negligence on 
plaintiff's part will not trigger the application of the clean hands 
maxim.34 
The clean hands defense exists not so much for the benefit of the 
defendant who will, of course, directly benefit if the defense is 
successful in blocking a plaintiff's request for equitable relief, but 
rather is for the protection of the court to ensure that it does not 
expend its time and public resources in determining how the proceeds 
of an inequitable transaction should be awarded. An equity court 
"must decline to lend its aid to either party to a transaction that in its 
inception offends concepts of decency and honest dealing.,,35 Since 
the clean hands maxim is designed to preserve the integrity of the 
30. Grabimdike, 55 N.W.2d at 767 (citation omitted). 
31. Mich. Mobile Homeover Ass'n, 223 N.W.2d at 731. 
32. See EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND 
INJUNCTIONS § 5.9 (1989). 
33. Stanchik v. Winkel, 230 N.W.2d 529,534 (Mich. 1975). 
34. See Attorney General v. Ankersen, 385 N.W.2d 658, (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
35. New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 
291 F.2d 471, 472 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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judiciary, courts may apply it on their own motion.36 In the words 
of the Supreme Court: "The clean hands doctrine is more than just 
another defense to be used by the party seeking to block specific 
performance. It is a doctrine to be invoked by the Court in its 
discretion to protect the integrity of the Court."37 
Because the clean hands maxim is designed primarily to protect 
the integrity of the judicial process, unlike other equitable defenses, 
the clean hands maxim focuses on the plaintiff's conduct, not on any 
harm to the defendant caused by that conduct. "[T] he primary factor 
to be considered is whether the plaintiffs sought to mislead or deceive 
the other party[,] not whether that party relied upon plaintiffs' 
misrepresen tations. "38 
For example, in Isbell v. Brighton Area Schools,39 the plaintiff, who 
was denied a high school diploma for excessive absences, was awarded 
injunctive relief (issuance of a high school diploma) because the trial 
court concluded that the attendance policy was unreasonable. 
However, the court of appeals reversed because regardless of the 
reasonableness of the school's attendance policy, the plaintiff had 
unclean hands: she admittedly had forged excuse notes. Her deceit, 
not the defendant's reliance on the forged notes, disqualified her 
from receiving equitable relief.40 
E. Equality is Equity 
Although no recent Michigan cases discuss this equitable maxim, 
the policy underlying the maxim is that persons who are similarly 
circumstanced should be treated equally, and that none among them 
should receive preferential treatment at the hands of a court sitting in 
equity. In the early case, Turnbull v. Prentiss Lumber Co. ,41 the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that among unsecured creditors of an 
insolvent corporation, "equality is equity," and that they were each 
entitled to a fair distribution of the corporate assets. Likewise, in 
Comstock v. Potter,42 the court held that a surety was entitled to 
contribution from its cosureties, resting its holding on the maxim, 
36. Stanchik 230 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Mich. 1975). In that case, the plaintiffs' 
request for specific performance was rejected because "in their efforts to acquire 
property from an elderly couple, [they] intentionally misrepresented themselves as 
agents of the timber company in order to enhance the chances of success. This 
conduct leaves them with unclean hands." Id. at 534-35. 
37. Id. at 534. 
38. Id. 
39. 500 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. 1993). 
40. Id. at 749. 
41. 21 N.W. 375 (Mich. 1884). 
42. 158 N.W. 102 (Mich. 1916). 
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"equality is equity.,,43 
R Where There Are Equal Equities, The First In Time Shall Prevail 
This equitable maxim is so time honored and well understood 
that the courts have seen little need to expound on it (as reflected in 
the dearth of reported cases that discuss or analyze the maxim). The 
principle is simple: As between two equally innocent persons, both of 
whom have acted in good faith, to whom should a remedy be given? 
Equity employs the "first-in-time" rule as the tie-breaker.44 
G. Where the Equities Are Equal, The Law Must Prevail 
If two parties have equal, but conflicting, equities with regard to 
the same subject matter, and one of them also obtains legal right to 
that subject matter, an equity court will not upset that legal right.45 
The most commonly cited illustration of this maxim in operation 
involves cases where legal title to property that is subject to an 
equitable right (such as property held in trust) is sold to a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice of the outstanding equity. As 
between the two parties holding the equitable right, the bona fide 
purchaser prevails because he holds legal title to the transferred 
property. Differences in time in the origin of the respective equities 
do not render them unequal. Consequently, this maxim trumps the 
maxim that where the equities are equal, the first in time shall 
prevai1.46 
H. Equity Aids the Vigilant, Not Those Who Slumber on Their Rights 
This eighth equitable maxim expresses the equitable doctrine of 
laches which is the policy in equity against delay in the assertion of 
rights, analogous to the common law policy embodied in the statute 
of limitations. Laches differs from limitations, however, in that 
"limitations are concerned with the fact of delay," while "laches [is 
concerned] with the effect of delay.,,47 The linchpin of the laches 
defense is prejudice to the defendant as a result of plaintiff's lack of 
due diligence in bringing her claim.4s For example, if all the 
43. ld. at 105. 
44. See Commercial Investment Trust v. Bay City Bank, 62 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 
1933). 
45. Hudson v. Village of Homer, 87 N.W.2d 72,76 (Mich. 1957). 
46. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 12, at 70. 
47. Lothian v. City of Detroit, 324 N.W.2d 9,14 (Mich. 1982) (quoting Sloan v. 
Silberstein, 141 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966»; See also Great Lakes Gas 
Transmission Co. v. MacDonald, 485 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
48. Eberhard v. Harper-Grace Hospitals, 445 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989); See also City of Holland v. Manish Enterprises, 436 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Mich. Ct. 
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witnesses to an event have died, or memories have faded, due to 
plaintiff's lack of due diligence, laches will be found to exist. 
McClintock succinctly summarizes the defense of laches as follows: 
Where a party has unreasonably delayed the assertion of an 
equitable claim until the other party has acted, or the 
circumstances have changed, so as to result in prejudice 
because of the delay, equity will hold the party claiming the 
right to be guilty of laches, and will deny relief to him.49 
Along with the unclean hands doctrine discussed above, laches is 
the chief defense to equitable claims brought by a plaintiff who has 
unreasonably delayed his claim. It is closely related to the doctrine of 
estoppe1.50 
Historically, equity usually foreclosed a plaintiff from bringing a 
claim after the period equal to the analogous statute of limitations. 
The Michigan legislature codified the traditional rule by providing 
that the same limitations period applies equally to legal and equitable 
actions, thus eliminating a trial court's discretion to entertain an 
equitable claim after the applicable period of limitations has run.51 
This change is a reflection of the familiar principle that equitable 
relief will not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at law. 
Prejudice to the defendant is conclusively presumed if the plaintiff 
brings an action for equitable relief beyond the limitations period. By 
the same token, even though the analogous limitations period has not 
run, a trial court retains the discretion to dismiss a claim on the 
ground of unreasonable and prejudicial delay in bringing it. 
L Equity Follows the Law 
Of all the equitable maxims discussed, the maxim that equity 
follows the law is perhaps the most important because it expresses a 
significant barrier to the grant of equitable relief: Equity cannot be 
used to deprive a person of a legal right. While equity in a proper 
case may reform a contract on the ground of mutual mistake of fact, 
or rescind a contract for fraud in the inducement or duress, equity 
cannot impose a new contract on the parties or supply deliberate 
omissions. 
According to the Michigan Supreme Court, "[i]t is fundamental 
that equity follows the law. The purpose of the rule is to prohibit 
vexatious litigation."52 An even more compelling explanation for this 
App.1988). 
49. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 12, at 71. 
50. Seaman v. Ironwood Amusement Corp., 278 N.W. 51, 59 (Mich. 1938). 
51. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5815 (West 1987). 
52. La Bour V. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 55 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Mich. 1952). 
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maxim is that it is intended to prevent equity courts from straying 
from the plain, unambiguous language of a statute in those cases 
where adhering to the statutory command might work a hardship in 
the particular case. Courts of equity are no more exempt from 
following clear expressions of legislative intent than are courts of law. 
Even if an equity court ~uestions the wisdom of the legislature, the 
court may not interfere.' The Michigan Supreme Court made this 
point abundantly clear in City of Lansing v. Twp. of Lansing.54 "Courts 
of equity, as well as of law, must apply legislative enactments in accord 
with the plain intent of the legislature. An argument that a statute as 
construed may, in certain instances, work great hardship is one that 
should be addressed to the legislature rather than the COUrt."55 
In an even more dramatic fashion, the court of appeals rejected 
a plaintiff's claim to a $1.5 million prize in a Michigan lottery drawing 
where the plaintiff had lost the winning ticket.56 Despite solid 
evidence that he had purchased the winning ticket, the court 
concluded that equity follows the law and held that "[w]hile plaintiff's 
predicament in the instant case is heartbreaking, we are unable to 
afford him the relief he requests because the law is clear" [Le., in 
order to claim a lottery prize, a winning ticket must be presented].fi' 
J. Summary 
These nine equitable maxims represent in shorthand form the 
principles by which equitable relief is granted or denied. The policy 
for each of them acts as a guide and governor on the exercise of an 
equity court's discretion. Against this backdrop, the discussion now 
turns to a review of equitable remedies and defenses. What remedies 
are available from an equity court? What is the interplay of equitable 
principles and precedent in the administration of these remedies? 
And finally, what are the equitable defenses to requests for equitable 
relief? We tum to a consideration of equitable defenses first. 
N. EQUITABLE REMEDIES AND DEFENSES 
A. Generally, What Defenses Are Available to Defeat an Equitable Claim? 
The defenses most commonly raised to defeat a claim for 
equitable relief are estoppel, unclean hands, and laches. Regardless 
of the nature of the equitable relief sought, these three defenses may 
53. Senters v. Ottawa Savings Bank, 503 N.W.2d 639, 644 (Mich. 1993). 
54. 97 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. 1959). 
55. Id. at 809 (citations omitted). 
56. Ramirez v. Bureau of State Lottery, 463 N.W.2d 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
57. Id. at 250. 
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always be raised when the facts warrant. Besides these three defenses 
that have across-the-board application, other specific defenses also 
exist. For example, defenses that are specific to the contract setting 
are mistake, misrepresentation, and unconscionability. These defenses 
will be discussed below. 
The three common defenses-equitable estoppel, unclean hands, 
and laches-are close relations of each other. For example, estoppel 
means that a party is "stopped" from claiming or saying something, 
even if it is the truth or a lawful claim, because of some prior 
inconsistent statement or activity that the other party relied on to his 
detriment. Similarly, the equitable doctrine of laches, as previously 
mentioned, bars a plaintiff who has unreasonably delayed asserting a 
claim where prejudice to the defendant would result. On the other 
hand, unlike the estoppel or laches defense, reliance or prejudice is 
not required to successfully raise the unclean hands defense. 
1. Equitable Estoppel 
Equitable estoppel seeks to prevent one person from gaining an 
advantage over another by misleading conduct. No single definition 
can govern every case, but at its core the doctrine of estoppel has four 
key elements. First, the actor, with knowledge of the facts, communi-
cates something to another in a misleading way, either by words, 
conduct, or silence. Second, the other person reasonably relied on 
that communication. Third, the other person would be materially 
harmed if the actor is permitted to assert a claim inconsistent with his 
earlier conduct. Fourth, the actor should have known that the other 
party would rely on the misleading communication.58 Although 
equitable and promissory estoppel share in common the element of 
inducement, what distinguishes equitable from promissory estoppel is 
that with the latter there is detrimental reliance on a promise, whereas 
with the former there is detrimental reliance on representations. 
Because estoppel is so easy to invoke, and so likely to proceed 
without analysis, the use of estoppel may actually work an injustice. 
It is worth emphasizing that estoppel is not meant to put either party 
in a better than rightful position. And what is the rightful position of 
the parties? That cannot be judged without analysis, which should 
include an assessment of all the remedies available. Equitable 
estoppel should be applied only in cases where the facts calling for it 
and the wrong to be prevented are both unquestionable.59 
58. 1DoBBS, supra § note 4, § 2.3(5) at 85. See, e.g., Dellar v. Frankenmuth 
Mutual Ins. Co., 433 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
59. 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 2.3(5), at 90. 
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2. Unclean Hands 
The unclean hands defense has been discussed above. The 
defense is closely related to other equitable defenses, such as 
unconscionability in contracts. Like most of the equitable maxims, the 
term "unclean hands" can too easily become a substitute for analy-
sis. 60 Its limitations must be clearly understood: it is a defense to 
equitable relief only, and not a bar to legal claims. In the words of 
Professor Dobbs: 
If judges had the power to deny damages and other legal 
remedies because a plaintiff came into court with unclean 
hands, citizens would not have rights, only privileges .... 
The merger of law and equity ... does not suggest that a 
judge has discretion to bar [legal] rights as well as to limit 
[equitable] remedies.61 
Dobbs suggests a three-step analysis to guide courts when asked 
to determine whether the plaintiff has unclean hands.62 First, a 
court should ask whether the defense being invoked is really legal 
rather than equitable. For example, if the plaintiff attempts to 
enforce an illegal contract, then the analysis should proceed on the 
basis of the illegality defense not unclean hands. Second, if the 
defense is really the equitable one of unclean hands, then it should 
only bar equitable relief, not legal relief. Third, if the defense is 
purely the equitable one of unclean hands, then three subsidiary 
questions should be asked: (a) Is the misconduct serious? (b) Is the 
misconduct closely related to the claim such that it injured the 
defendant, or is it merely collateral to the claim? (c) Will invocation 
of the unclean hands defense interfere with the vindication of legal 
goals, such as support obligations? 
The plaintiff's misconduct need not rise to the level of a crime to 
successfully invoke the clean hands doctrine,63 although many cases 
in which the unclean hands defense is invoked are cases where the 
plaintiff's conduct was illegal. At the least, the plaintiff's improper 
conduct must be substantially and significantly related to the claim 
being asserted. Equitable relief is not reserved exclusively for saints. 
Sinners are also entitled to equitable relief. Moreover, to further 
corral the discretionary element inherent in ruling on the defense, the 
wrongdoing must have been directed against the defendant himself 
60. See Zechariah Chafee,jr., Coming Into Equity with Clean Hands (pts. 1 & 2),47 
MICH. L. REv. 877, 1065 (1949) [hereinafter Chafee]. 
61. !DOBBS, supra note 4, § 2.4(2), at 94. 
62. Id. § 2.4(2), at 97-99. 
63. Stachnik, 394 Mich. 375, 230 N.W.2d 529,534 (Mich. 1960). 
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and not some third party.64 In Michigan, a defendant will not be 
precluded from invoking the clean hands defense even though he 
himself was guilty of misconduct in the transaction.65 The defense 
is viewed as a means of protecting the reputation of the court,66 and 
for that reason the court will not grant equitable relief to a plaintiff 
who is ~ilty of misconduct even if the defendant also committed a 
wrong.6 
The danger of the clean hands doctrine is that it is "a slogan that 
avoids analysis ... [that] may lend itself to misapplication."68 In 
addition, it is a doctrine that may be superfluous insofar as other 
better defined rules exist to cut off a plaintiff who has engaged in 
misconduct, such as misrepresentation and illegality. 
3. Laches 
As noted, laches is an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in 
prosecuting a claim of which the plaintiff knew or should have known, 
causing prejudice to the defendant. 69 A plaintiff guilty of laches may 
be barred from receiving any equitable relief; injunctions, specific 
performance, rescission, and reformation. The laches rule finds its 
origins in equity because there was no statute of limitations applicable 
to claims seeking equitable relief. In Michigan, the legislature closed 
this lacuna by enacting M.C.L. § 600.5815, which provides that the 
prescribed limitations period applies equally to all actions, regardless 
of the relief sought, and that the doctrine of laches also applies in 
equitable proceedings. Thus, even though the claim might not be 
time barred by the applicable statute oflimitations, it may nevertheless 
be barred because of unreasonable, prejudicial delay by the plaintiff 
in bringing his claim. 
The same conduct that might give rise to a defense of laches 
could equally qualify as an estoppel or waiver. For example, if the 
plaintiff delays in bringing a claim, suggesting that he does not intend 
to pursue it, and the defendant relies on this to her detriment, all the 
elements of estoppel are present. 
64. Chafee, supra note 60, at 88l. 
65. See Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist., 227 N.W.2d 736, 746 (Mich. 1975). 
66. Isbell v. Brighton Area Schools, 500 N.W.2d 748, 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
67. Id. at 189, 227 N.W.2d at 748; See Leland v. Ford, 223 N.W. 218, 221 (Mich. 
1929). 
68. 3DOBBS, supra note 4, at § 12.8(4), at 22l. 
69. Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co. v. MacDonald. 485 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1992); Eberhard v. Harper-Grace Hospitals, 445 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Mich. 
1989); Bennington Twp. v. Maple River Inter-County Drain Board. 386 N.W.2d 599, 
603 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
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B. Generally, What Remedies Are Available From an Equity Court? 
Equitable remedies can be divided into two kinds: coercive and 
restitutio nary. Coercive, or injunctive, remedies are the most 
common. Injunctions can be prohibitory, enjoining a defendant from 
doing specific acts either permanently or provisionally pending the 
outcome of the litigation; or mandatory, commanding a defendant to 
perform specific acts. Examples of prohibitory injunctions include 
ordering a defendant to cease a repeated trespass or to desist from 
acts that constitute a nuisance. The classic mandatory injunction is, 
of course, an order requiring the seller of land to specifically perform 
the contract by conveying the land as promised. An injunctive order 
always carries with it the implicit threat of being held in contempt of 
court for violating the order. 
The second broad category of equitable remedies is restitutionary 
in nature. Restitutionary remedies prevent the defendant's unjust 
enrichment at the expense of the plaintiff by requiring the defendant 
to restore to the plaintiff something that belongs to him. When a 
contract is rescinded, for example, each party must make restitution 
of what she received under the contract. Reformation is also a form 
of restitution: the defendant is required to return to the plaintiff the 
agreement the parties actually entered into but for a mutual mistake 
of fact. 
Most equitable remedies and the manner in which they are 
granted or denied can be illustrated in the contract setting. The 
American legal system has a number of remedies that may be granted 
for breach of contract. Most often, the injured party receives 
compensation in the form of money damages. Specific performance 
or an injunction is an alternative equitable remedy to an award of 
money damages as a method of enforcing contracts. An order of 
specific performance usually directs the party in breach to render the 
promised performance. In the context of contract law, injunctions 
usually take the form of an order directing a party to refrain from 
doing a specified act. An example would be enforcing a covenant not 
to compete throu~h an injunction directing the promisor to refrain 
from competition. 0 
Rescission, cancellation, and reformation of contracts are the 
other alternative, and mutually exclusive, equitable remedies. 
Rescission nullifies a contract completely and returns the parties to the 
position they would have been in had no contract been made. 
Rescission is the term generally used to void a contract that is 
executory. Cancellation describes the remedy for rescinding wholly 
70. The subject of injunctions is discussed below. 
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executed contracts, or voiding legal instruments such as deeds. The 
same rules apply to both remedies. Reformation may be granted if a 
contract contains a term that was the product of a mutual mistake of 
fact or of fraud. An equity court has the power to reform a contract 
to make it conform to the agreement the parties actually made, but 
the court cannot make a new contract for the parties. 
1. When Should a Court Order Specific Performance? 
It is axiomatic that the remedy of specific performance is an 
extraordinary remedy; that it is not available as a matter of right, 
unlike the legal remedy of money damages; and that the grant of the 
remedy is within the discretion of the court. Nevertheless, the 
exercise of that discretion must be based on established equitable 
principles71 and can be reviewed de novo on appeal. In that respect, 
the discretion exercised by an equity court in granting or denying 
equitable relief must be carefully distinguished from the discretion the 
trial judge exercises in such matters as are committed to his discretion 
at the trial and which can be reviewed only for abuse of discretion, 
such as orders permitting the amendment of pleadings and discovery 
orders. These two kinds of discretion are a far cry from one another. 
While the deference accorded the trial judge is great in such matters, 
that same level of deference does not exist in the context of an equity 
court's grant or denial of equitable remedies. The less deferential 
standard of review in equity cases is based on the principle that the 
appellate court in equity is to render the decree that should have 
been rendered below. In short, equity discretion is not as wide 
ranging as some of the reported cases would lead the casual reader to 
believe. 
Moreover, to say that the remedy of specific performance is not 
available as a matter of right because it is an equitable remedy is too 
facile of a conclusion. That assertion overlooks a consistent line of 
cases involving the enforcement of contracts for the purchase ofland. 
In those cases, specific performance is routinely granted. Specific 
performance of a contract relating to personal property, on the other 
hand, is generally denied because of the adequacy of the legal remedy 
of damages. An exception exists where the property is unique, rare, 
or has sentimental value.72 Section 716(2) of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code authorizes specific performance where goods are unique, 
and cryptically adds that specific performance can also be granted in 
71. See Continental & Vogue Health Studios, Inc. v. Abra Corp., 120 N.W.2d 835 
(Mich. 1963); Blackwell v. Keyes, 91 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Mich. 1958); MCCLlNfOCK, 
supra note 12, at 129. 
72. Bayer v.Jackson City Bank & Trust Co., 55 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Mich. 1952); 
Kent v. Bell, 132 N.W.2d 601,604 (Mich. 1965). 
HeinOnline -- 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 629 1996-1997
1997] EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN MICHIGAN 629 
other proper circumstances.73 
In ruling on requests for specific performance of a contract, 
courts must be vigilant and sensitive to the need to husband scarce 
judicial resources. Courts will not grant specific performance of a 
contract if they consider enforcement to be impracticable. For 
example, cases in which the court might be required to supervise 
enforcement over a long period of time might impose excessive 
demands on the court's resources. The practicability limitation 
surfaces in three typical cases: (1) when a landowner seeks specific 
performance of a contract for construction or repair work,74 (2) 
where important contract terms are vague or uncertain, and (3) 
contracts for personal services where a rupture in the relationship has 
occurred making it difficult to monitor the quality of the services 
rendered.75 The Second Restatement of Torts proposes a balancing 
test that calls for denying specific performance if the performance is 
so extensive that the burdens of supervision outweigh the plaintiff's 
advantages in having specific performance.76 However, the Restate-
ment's balancing test is subject to criticism, because evaluating the 
burdens of supervision and the plaintiff's advantage requires ajudicial 
assessment that is based on bare discretion rather than the application 
of rules. The judge's only guide would be her own personal discre-
tion, making the judge unaccountable. A better guide is to inquire 
whether the plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy in damages and, 
if not, to determine whether enforcement of the contract would in 
fact require long supervision. 
In summary, if granting specific performance will enmesh a court 
in continuous and long-term judicial supervision of its order, the court 
should be very hesitant to grant the remedy of s{1ecific perfor-
mance.77 For example, equity courts often refuse to specifically 
enforce long-term contractual arrangements, such as construction 
contracts, commercial leases, and franchises, in order to avoid being 
73. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 440.2716(1) (West 1994). "Other proper 
circumstances" might include a situation where substitute goods are not available in 
the market and damages will not provide adequate compensation. See, e.g., Jaup V. 
Olmstead, 55 N.W.2d 119, 120 (Mich. 1952) (pre-Code case). 
74. See Eliot Axelrod, Judicial Attitudes Toward SPecifzc Enforcement of Construction 
Contracts, 7 DAYTON L. REv. 33 (1981). 
75. See 3 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 12.8(3), at 206-07. The refusal by courts to 
specifically enforce personal sernce contracts must be qualified by any statutory 
remedy of reinstatement in cases of unlawful employment discrimination. Pursuant 
to the maxim that equity follows the law, an equity court cannot ignore a clear statuto-
rycommand. 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 (1981). 
77. Laker V. Soverinsky, 27 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Mich. 1947); Edidin V. Detroit 
Economic Growth Corp., 352 N.W.2d 288,291 (Mich. 1984). 
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drawn into long-term supervision of performance under the agree-
ment. 
2. Assuming Specific Peiformance Would Otherwise Be An 
Appropriate Remedy, What Are the Grounds for Denying 
Such Relief? 
As a general matter, plaintiff's conduct in relation to the contract 
may bar the remedy of specific performance. The plaintiff must not 
have an adequate remedy at law. In other words, if damages would 
make the plaintiff whole, then the plaintiff has an adequate remedy 
at law. Moreover, the plaintiff must come into court with clean hands. 
In addition, specific performance will not be ordered unless the terms 
of the contract are clear and complete in all essential terms. 
Mutual mistake as to material facts will also bar specific perfor-
mance. Unconscionable or fraudulent contracts will not be specifically 
enforced. Finally, as discussed previously, the plaintiff who has 
unreasonably delayed to the detriment of the defendant in bringing 
a claim for specific performance will be barred by laches. 
a. Does the Plaintiff Have an Adequate Legal Remedy? 
Specific performance, and other injunctive remedies, will be 
denied unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the legal remedy would 
not be adequate. A legal remedy may be inadequate, and specific 
performance justified, if the contract involves the sale of something 
unique, such as land, a work of art, or an heirloom. In those cases, 
money is not an adequate substitute because the items are not 
fungible. The difficulty of finding a substitute in the market may 
render the legal remedy inadequate, but in such cases great care and 
sound discretion are called for on the part of the court in determin-
ing adequacy. 
From a functional perspective, the adequacy test essentially 
reaches the same result the parties probably would have bargained for 
if bargaining for a remedy was possible. For example, a person buying 
something unique would probably have bargained for specific 
performance, but a person buying widgets would probably have 
bargained for (and would probably prefer) damages. 
b. Does the Plaintiff Have Unclean Hands, or Is He Guilty 
of Unreasonable Delay? 
As with all equitable remedies, a plaintiff who seeks specific 
performance must come to court with clean hands and must not be 
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guilty of unreasonable delay.78 
c. Is the Contract Complete and Unambiguous in All Its 
Essential Terms? 
631 
At the risk of stating the obvious, courts cannot be expected, as 
a practical matter, to order the performance of a contract unless they 
can determine from the contract exactly what performance to order. 
An equity court simply cannot order the performance of a contract in 
which the terms are uncertain. This ground for denying specific 
performance has both a due process component (the order must 
reasonably guide the defendant) and a self-protective aspect (an equity 
court does not want to become bogged down in the task of overseeing 
its orders). A contract need not be so indefinite that even an action 
for breach seeking damages would fail. At the same time, however, a 
greater degree of certainty in contract terms is required when a party 
is seeking specific performance rather than damages.79 
d. When is Duress a Proper Ground for Refusing to Order 
Specific Performance of a Contract? 
Duress is "the use of improper threats or economic pressure to 
secure a contract or some other action."so Like the other two types 
of misconduct discussed immediately hereafter-undue influence and 
unconscionability-duress is largely defensive and is typically used to 
defeat a claim for specific performance. However, it may also be used 
offensively to rescind an agreement and seek restitution. To show 
duress, it is necessary to prove: (1) a wrongful act or threat, (2) that 
left the victim no reasonable alternative, and (3) to which the victim 
in fact acceded, (4) resulting in a transaction that was unfair to the 
victim.81 The easy cases of a wrongful act or threat are those 
involving physical compulsion or the threat thereof. Interestingly, the 
most common variety of duress today is economic or business 
compulsion. 
The 1:\\'0 recurring issues in duress cases are the wrongfulness of 
the threat and coercion of the victim. Not all economic threats 
warrant the unmaking of an agreement. All bargaining involves a 
degree of compulsion.82 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts adopts an objective test that questions whether the plaintiff'\vas 
left with no reasonable alternative but to succumb to the defendant's 
78. See, e.g., Holy Cross Baptist Church v. D.V. Constr. Co., 117 N.W.2d 159 
(Mich. 1962); Grade v. Loafman, 22 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. 1940). 
79. Spaulding v. Wyckoff, 31 N.W.2d 71,73 (Mich. 1948). 
80. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 10.1, at 632. 
81. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175 & 176 (1981). 
82. SeeJohn Dalzell, Duress by Ecorwmic Pressure, 20 N.C. L. REv. 237 (1942). 
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demand.83 Generalizations in this area are hazardous because they 
may invite courts to become too involved in the parties' economic 
transactions. Nevertheless, with that caveat in mind, it is not 
ordinarily wrongful to threaten what one has a right to do. Further, 
it is not wrong to deal with a person who is in financial or emotional 
difficulty and who may accept an otherwise unattractive offer.84 On 
the other hand, it is ordinarily wrongful to threaten a tort or criminal 
act, a criminal prosecution, or a civil suit that is unfounded.85 
e. When is undue influence a proper ground for refusing to 
order specific performance of a contract? 
Undue influence differs from duress in that duress involves overt 
coercion by threats, whereas undue influence involves covert persua-
sion by manipulation.86 The issue of mental incapacity is often 
present in undue influence cases, as it is in cases of misrepresentation. 
Much of the law of undue influence arises in the context of confiden-
tial relationships. Thus, the most important evidence in undue 
influence cases is the existence of a confidential relationship in which 
the submissive party reposes trust in the dominant party. For 
example, a presumption of undue influence exists when a will is made 
by a patient in favor of a physician,87 a client in favor of an attor-
ney,88 or a parishioner in favor of a clergyman.89 
As with duress and unconscionability, discussed hereafter, too 
often courts describe the misconduct that constitutes undue influence 
in vague and moralistic terms, which prevents serious analysis of the 
policy reasons for these defenses. A less subjective and more analytical 
rationale for these defenses would focus on the misuse of information. 
One of the most important reasons for the defense of undue 
influence, for example, is to prevent the misuse of information in 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 175, comment b (1981). 
84. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 10.2(2), at 640. For example, in Musialv. Yatzik, the 
Michigan Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's claim of duress as a ground for 
rescission where "his acute need for money drove him to enter into the settle-
ment. . .. [E]ven assuming duress, it was not caused by the [defendants] and cannot 
be raised as a basis for attacking the settlement contract." Musial v. Yatzik, 45 N.W.2d 
329, 331 (Mich. 1951). See al50 Alpert Industries, Inc. v. Oakland Metal Stamping Co., 
141 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) ("[t]he mere fact that the defendant was 
in severe financial difficulty does not constitute undue influence or oppression on the 
part of the plaintiffs"). 
85. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 10.2(2), at 640. 
86. Id. § 10.3, at 656. 
87. In re Hartlerode's Estate, 148 N.W. 774, 777 (Mich. 1914). 
88. Creller v. Baer, 93 N.W.2d 259,261 (Mich. 1958). 
89. Hill v. Hairston, 299 Mich. 672, 1 N.W.2d 34,36 (Mich. 1941). 
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reaching bargains.90 In undue influence cases, which typically arise 
in the context of confidential or fiduciary relationships, the fiduciary 
or dominant party has an affirmative duty not only to disclose informa-
tion but also to avoid the use of information that rightfully belongs to 
the beneficiary that would be to the advantage of the fiduciary at the 
expense of the beneficiary. 
f. 'When is Unconscionability a Proper Ground for 
Refusing to Order Specific Perfonnance of a Contract? 
Early equity courts developed the formless defense of unconscio-
nability to bar a plaintiff's request for specific performance. Since this 
was a matter of the chancellor's discretion, and not of principle, 
equity never developed a clear set of rules capable of rigorous analysis. 
In addition, the plaintiff who sued for specific performance might find 
his equitable remedy barred but still have his legal remedy of 
damages. 
The equitable doctrine of unconscionability has a long history in 
Michigan. In 1868, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to grant the 
specific performance of a contract that would have given the buyer an 
unconscionable advantage.91 The doctrine was later adopted by the 
Michigan legislature when it enacted the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC)92 and has been judicially extended to cover contracts outside 
the scope of the UCC.93 
The narrow remedial limitations imposed by equitable-unconscio-
nability are to be contrasted with the broad limitations of UCC-
unconscionability. Under the latter, both legal claims for damages 
and equitable claims for specific performance may be barred.94 
Today in Michigan, there is a two-pronged test for determining 
whether a contract is unenforceable as unconscionable that incorpo-
rates both procedural and substantive unconscionability.95 The first 
inquiry focuses on procedural unconscionability and asks the following 
questions: What is the relative bargaining power of the parties? What 
is their relative economic strength? What are their alternative sources 
of supply? What are their options? The second inquiry focuses on 
90. In the case of misrepresentation, on the other hand, one is prohibited from 
lying, but one generally has no duty to affirmatively disclose. 
91. Eames v. Eames, 16 Mich. 348, 350 (1868). 
92. MICH. COMPo LAws § 440.2302 (1994). 
93. Reed v. Kaydon Engineering Corp., 196 N.W.2d 487, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1972). 
94. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 10.7, at 704-05. . 
95. See Paulsen v. Bureau of State Lottery, 421 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1988); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719, 723 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Stenke v. Masland Development Co., 394 N.W.2d 418,423-24 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
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substantive unconscionability and asks only one broad question: Is the 
challenged term substantively reasonable? Some of the more specific 
fact situations in which cases of substantive unconscionability arise 
involve a price term that is either grossly excessive or grossly inade-
quate. In actuality, such cases often involve misrepresentation, duress, 
or undue influence. Unconscionability in such cases serves as an 
analytical surrogate but is not very satisfying because of the subjective 
assessments called for in determining substantive reasonableness. 
Other instances in which substantive unconscionability arises 
involve the limitation of remedies, such as liquidated damages clauses. 
Again, however, equity courts deal with such clauses under the rubric 
of the refusal to enforce forfeitures or penalties. Even if the contract 
is one of adhesion-thus satisfying the first prong-the challenged 
term is nevertheless enforceable if it is substantively reasonable at the 
time of contracting.96 
While process unconscionability has a sound footing in basic 
contract principles of freedom of contract, substantive unconscionabil-
ity is troubling because it invites courts to rewrite or rescind contracts 
it considers to be unfair without offering standards or rules for doing 
so. Everyone is a victim of his or her limited bargaining power. 
Everyone would like a lower price. As the foregoing discussion of 
undue influence and duress indicates, economic compulsion is behind 
every contract to some degree. Still, whenjudges relieve a party from 
what is, with the benefit of hindsight, an improvident bargain, the 
end-product may be an individualized decision of a well-intentioned 
judge but not a decision that rests on rules. As Professor Dobbs 
noted: 
In a discretionary regime, parties appear before judges as 
supplicants. In a rights regime, they demand their entitle-
ments. . . . We need to believe that beneficent, wise, and just 
judges will eliminate technicalities in favor of justice. We 
also need to believe that we have rights that cannot be 
dispensed with when a judge's perception, beneficence, or 
wisdom fails. . . . 
[In that connection], [t]he problem with substantive 
unconscionability is perhaps not vagueness itself but the 
invitation to disrespect the parties' autonomy.97 
Can discretion reposed in a judge to deny or grant relief be 
reconciled with rights under law? Only if the judge who exercises that 
discreti<?n is extremely wise, and the range of his discretion when 
96. Id. 
97. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 10.7, at 708-10. 
HeinOnline -- 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 635 1996-1997
1997] EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN MICHIGAN 
doing so is narrowly circumscribed. 
g. Should a Court Refuse to Order Specific Performance of 
a Contract When It Considers the Contract to be 
"Unfair" or When It Believes There is a Disparity in the 
Overall Bargain? 
635 
Disparity in the overall bargain and unfairness in the contract 
terms have been cited as independent grounds for refusing to order 
specific performance.98 However, disparity or unfairness alone are 
not a basis for denying specific performance. Simply stated, it is not 
wrong to enforce a hard bargain. 
Rather than being the end-point of an analysis, contract disparity 
and unfairness should be viewed as the starting point of an analysis for 
examining a contract for possible misconduct in the formation stage. 
A contract that strikes a judge as one-sided or unfair in its terms may 
in fact be the product of misconduct, such as duress, undue influence, 
or unconscionability. Professor Yorio noted that "it is unusual in 
practice to find gross disparity without some evidence of procedural 
unfairness. ,,99 When placing reliance on objective factors that 
evidence misconduct in the contract formation stage rather than 
vague and formless notions of fairness, a judge rests his or her opinion 
on law, instead of personal justice. 
Denying specific performance on grounds of unfairness is subject 
to heavy criticism. First, unfairness can too often be a naked appeal 
to a judge's personal discretion and sense of fairness, not to rules. 
Second, if courts refuse specific performance of valid and untainted 
contracts simply because they feel that the plaintiff negotiated a better 
deal than the defendant, that refusal acts to undermine the very 
foundation of contract stability. Unfairness of a contract should rarely 
be a stand-alone reason for denying specific performance.lOO It, 
appeals too strongly to a judge's subjective notions of a "fair" result. 
On the other hand, a one-sided deal often suggests failures in the 
bargaining process, through misrepresentation or mistake. For 
example, a grossly inadequate price may be evidence of misrepresenta-
tion or mistake, two equitable defenses with well-defined criteria, as 
discussed below in connection with rescission. 
Similarly, as possible grounds for denying specific performance, 
98. SeeYORIO, supra note 32, §§ 5.4.1,5.4.3, at 1OfH)8, 110-12. Although in theory 
a contract that is the product of misconduct may be rescinded, in practice rather than 
rescind contracts tainted by misconduct in the formation stage, courts may simply 
refuse to grant specific performance and dismiss the complaint. 
99. [d. § 5.4.3., at 111. 
100. See Ruegsegger v. Bangor Twp. Relief Drain, 338 N .W.2d 410 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1983) (rejecting unfairness as ground for denying specific performance). 
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disparity in the overall bargain and unfairness are closely related to 
the clean hands and estoppel doctrines, which might be applicable in 
cases where the plaintiff has concealed important facts in the course 
of contract negotiations. In the past, in dealing with the fairness of 
a contract, Michigan court's have noted that unfairness, if any, is to be 
measured at the time of contractinglOl and that subsequent changes 
in the value of the property are not to be considered. 
Unfairness grounds closely resemble the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability. As is true with the unconscionability defense, the 
notion of unfairness has a procedural and substantive dimension. 102 
The procedural dimension focuses on the process of forming the 
agreement in the first place. The substantive dimension focuses on 
contract terms that are too one-sided. Disparity grounds likewise 
resemble the unconscionability test insofar as terms that reflect a gross 
disparity in the overall bargain may be an indication of procedural 
unconscionability, substantive unconscionability, or both. 
h. Is "Hardship" to the Defendant Grounds For Denying 
Specific Performance? 
Some commentators state that an equity court may deny specific 
performance of an othenvise valid contract, even where the plaintiff 
does not have an adequate legal remedy, if ~ting the relief would 
cause undue hardship to the defendant.10 Hardship grounds, as 
distinct from fairness grounds for denying equitable relief, consider 
changed circumstances that make the defendant's performance more 
burdensome. A burden or change in circumstances that was 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, however, is not grounds for 
relief, not even in equity. In such a case, the contract itself has 
allocated that risk, and the court should not be moved by unadorned 
hardship arguments to relieve the defendant from a bad bar?c~n.l04 
As noted by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Puziss v. Geddes: 0:> "In 
order to avoid specific performance on a theory of harshness or 
oppression, [defendant] must show inequities which appeal to the 
legal, as contrasted ,vith merely the subjective, discretion of the court. 
101. Stauch v. Daniels, 215 N.W. 311, 312 (Mich. 1927). 
102. See 3 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 12.8(4), at 216-17. 
103. See, e.g., MCCLINfOCK, supra note 12, at 188. 
104. Mohrlang v. Draper, 365 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Neb. 1985) {quoting Wilson & 
Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657, 666-67 (Neb. 1950» 
("difficulties, even if unforeseen and however great, are no excuse, and that the fact 
that a contract has become more burdensome in its operation than was anticipated 
is not ground for its rescission"). 
105. 771 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
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It is not enough to show that she made a bad bargain. "106 
If the remedy at law is inadequate so that specific performance is 
needed, relieving the defendant from a contract on grounds of ( 
hardship is the equivalent of denying the plaintiff any remedy at all 
for an otherwise valid and enforceable contract. 
Hardship grounds, like fairness grounds, is nothing more than a 
substitute for a genuine analysis and is a thinly-veiled excuse for 
exercising unfettered discretion in denying relief. In fact, sound non-
discretionary reasons usually exist for denying relief when hardship 
grounds are invoked, such as misrepresentation or fraud. l07 
3. Generally, When Should a Court Order Rescission or 
Cancellation of a Contract? 
Essentially, the equitable remedy of rescission results in the 
abrogation or "unmaking" of an agreement and attempts to return the 
parties to the status quo ante. As with all equitable relief, the remedy 
of rescission is granted only through the discretion of the court. lOS 
Common grounds for rescinding an agreement (in the case of 
executory contracts) or cancelling an agreement (in the case of 
executed contracts) are: (1) contracts that were procured through 
misconduct, such as fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, 
or unconscionability;109 (2) contracts entered into because of a 
mutual mistake of fact; (3) contracts where one party has failed to 
perform; and (4) contracts entered into by a person who lacked 
capacity to contract. In accord with the equitable maxim, "[h]e who 
seeks equity must do equity," the law is well settled that a condition 
precedent to the granting of the remedy of rescission is that the other 
party be returned to the status quO. IIO 
As is true with all equitable remedies, equity courts exercise sound 
judicial discretion to refuse to order rescission of a contract. As a 
matter of economic good sense, rescission could be too radical of a 
remedy, making monetary adjustment the preferable choice. lll For 
example, a misrepresentation that Blackacre contains 100 acres when 
in fact it contains only 95 acres might be material and justify an award 
106. [d. at 1030 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Beyer, 381 P.2d 494 (Or. 1963». 
107. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Lake Erie Land Co. v. 
Chilinski has been cited as authority for hardship grounds. Lake Erie Land Co. v. 
Chilinski, 163 N.W. 929 (1917). See llA CALLAGHAN'S MICH. PL. & PRAC. § 86.30 n. 
1 (1990). In that case, however, the Court rejected the plaintiff's request for specific 
performance on grounds of misrepresentation. Lake Erie Land Co., 163 N.W. at 932. 
108. Harris v. Axline, 36 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Mich. 1949). 
109. Duress, undue influence, and unconscionability are discussed above in 
connection with defenses to the remedy of specific performance. 
110. Schimke v. Scott, 106 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Mich. 1960). 
111. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 9.6, at 624. 
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of damages, but such a misrepresentation would not necessarily 
compel rescission.1l2 Similarly, plaintiffs delay in seeking rescission 
may bar the remedy either because of changed circumstances that 
make restitution impossible, or because of the suspicion that the 
plaintiff is speculating at the expense of the defendant, rescinding 
only if the market drops, otherwise retaining the fruits of the bargain. 
a. When May Fraud or Misrepresentation Be Invoked As 
Grounds For Rescinding a Contract? 
Although the same misconduct may give rise to both a claim for 
damages and for rescission of an agreement, the discussion here is 
limited to claims for rescission based on fraud or misrepresentation. 
The authorities divide misrepresentation into two categories: 
intentional and innocent. Either type may be grounds for res cis-
sion.1J3 Under Michigan law, the elements needed to establish 
intentional misrepresentation are the same as those needed to 
establish fraud: (1) a material misrepresentation, (2) which is false, 
(3) made with actual knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard 
of its truth, (4) with the intention that the plaintiff will rely thereon, 
and (5) upon which the plaintiff acts to his detriment.1l4 In the 
case of innocent misrepresentations, Michigan law assumes the third 
and fourth elements of a fraud claim, i.e., scienter or that the 
defendant intended for plaintiff to rely on the defendant's state-
ment. 115 Because innocent misrepresentation is easier to prove and 
has been restricted to contract cases, it, rather than intentional 
misrepresentation, will be invoked as grounds for contract rescission. 
Regarding the first element of misrepresentation, expressions of 
opinion are not ordinarily a basis for rescission for misrepresentation. 
Statements relating to past or existing facts may form the basis for a 
misrepresentation claim, but statements of opinion, statements that 
are promissory in nature, or salesperson's "puffing" may not. ll6 A 
112. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 28, comment d & illustration 1 (1937). 
113. See U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Black, 313 N.W.2d 77 (Mich. 1981); 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1487,1500 (3rd ed.1970). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS states, "[iJf a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a 
fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient 
is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient." RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). 
114. See Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 247 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1976); 
Arim v. General Motors Corp., 520 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); In re Allied 
Supermarkets, 951 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1991). 
115. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 412 Mich. 99, 313 N.W.2d at 77. 
116. Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 247 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1976); State-
William Partnership v. Gale, 425 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Van Tassel v. 
McDonald Corp., 407 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
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broken promise may constitute grounds for a breach of contract claim, 
but it does not give rise to a fraud claim.117 The test of materiality 
does not require that the misrepresentation relate to the sole or m~or 
raison d'etre for the agreement, only that it relate to an important 
fact.I IS 
The second element, falsity, is generally satisfied by an affirmative 
misstatement of fact, but is not satisfied by an omission.119 However, 
concealing a fact that one is bound to disclose is an indirect represen-
tation that such fact does not exist and may constitute the falsity 
prong of a prima facie case of misrepresentation.120 The third and 
fourth elements, knowledge of falsity and defendant's intention that 
plaintiff rely on the statement, respectively, have diminished impor-
tance in Michigan since a prima facie case of rescission on the ground 
of innocent misrepresentation-which is only available in the context 
of contract negotiations-does not require proof of these two 
elements. 121 Defendant's intention that plaintiff rely is conclusively 
presumed because statements made during contract negotiations are 
presumptively made with the intention that they be relied upon. 
As observed by Professor Dobbs, an innocent representation is a 
form of mistake, a mistake by the innocent speaker and the recipient 
as well. Accordingly, if the innocent representation concerns a basic 
assumption of the contract, rescission may be justified just as it would 
be in the case of mistake. 122 
Consistent with the merger of law and equity, and with pleading 
in the alternative,l23 a victim of innocent misrepresentation may 
simultaneously pursue either of two alternative remedies: She may 
affirm the contract and sue for damages, or seek rescission of the 
agreement upon making restitution, but she may not be awarded 
double recovery.124 When fraud or innocent misrepresentation as 
117. Michaels v. Amway Corp., 522 N.W.2d 703 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Marrero 
v. McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp., 505 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
118. See Papin v. Demski, 169 N.W.2d 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) afI'd, 177 N.W.2d 
166 (Mich. 1969). 
119. Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1991), ecrt. denied, 503 U.S. 
984 (1992). 
120. See Overton v. Anheuser-Busch Co., 517 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) 
appeal denied, 527 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1994) (plaintiff sought $10,000, alleging 
defendant's misleading advertisements caused him physical and mental injury, 
emotional distress, and financial (155). 
121. See Alpert Industries, Inc. v. Oakland Metal Stamping Co., 141 N.W.2d 671 
(Mich. 1966), rev'd, 150 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 1967). 
122. 2DoBBS, supra note 4, § 9.3(1), at 580. 
123. MICH. Cr. R. 2.111(A)(2). 
124. See e.g., Gross v. Morosky, 113 N.W.2d 863 (Mich. 1962); See also Walraven 
v. Martin, 333 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (Plaintiffs were permitted, despite 
a contrary ordinance to use apartment building consistent with their expectations 
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a ground for rescission is successfully invoked, it will have the effect 
of "unmaking" an agreement in a situation where the parties clearly 
intended serious consequences. A plaintiff who alleges fraud or 
misrepresentation makes a frontal assault on the stability and integrity 
of contracts. For this reason, such attacks are not favored in the 
law. l25 This judicial disfavor is reflected in the heightened pleading 
requirements for fraud and in the more demanding burden of proof 
placed on a plaintiff invoking fraud or innocent misrepresentation as 
a ground for rescission, who must prove the fraud or innocent 
misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence.126 
b. When is Mistake Properly Invoked as a Ground for 
Rescinding a Contract? 
In everyday speech errors in judgment are called mistakes, but 
not all errors in judgment are mistakes within legal contemplation. 
The legal definition of mistake requires a mistake of fact. Expecta-
tions are not facts. Consequently, a person whose future expectations 
are frustrated cannot rescind a contract for mutual mistake. There 
can be no mutual mistake as to an event which is to occur in the 
future. 127 Such events may give rise to a justified excuse for nonper-
formance of a contract-the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, 
and frustration come to mind-but future events cannot be the basis 
of mistake. 
Ignorance may be bliss, but not when it comes to contracts. In 
non-legal settings a deliberate failure to be informed may be a 
person's right, but it is no excuse warranting contract rescission. One 
who acts knowing that he does not know certain matters is consciously 
ignorant of them. He therefore does not have a state of mind at 
variance with the facts, the very definition of mistake. Courts often 
speak of this situation as an assumption of the risk:128 One who 
knows he doesn't know assumes the risk that the facts will tum out 
adversely to his interests. That person's options are clear: investigate 
and discover the facts, provide against adverse contingencies in the 
contract, or do not contract at all. An option that should not be 
resulting in an award of only nominal damages in their suit for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation) . 
125. See, e.g., MICH. Gr. R 2.112(B), which requires allegations of fraud and 
mistake to be stated with particularity. 
126. See Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 247 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1976); 
See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. CEI Florida, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994) (although Michigan has no cause of action for constructive fraud per se, 
it does recognize torts of innocent misreprenstation and silent fraud). 
127. See Alpert Industries, 141 N.W.2d 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966). 
128. See, e.g., Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 
1982). 
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available is resort to an equity court to rescue the risk taker from his 
lack of good judgment. It should be difficult to rescind a contract on 
the basis of a mistake in formation. If a party to a contract fails to 
allocate risks of ignorance to the other party, the former should be 
forced to bear any subsequent loss attributable to that failure. 
Contracts are bargains to be routinely enforced, not routinely 
rescinded. An overly eager application of the mistake rule would 
undercut the process of risk allocation that constitutes the essence of 
contract negotiations. 
Mistake cannot be a ground for rescission where the parties have 
allocated the risks of unexpected future events. When a buyer 
purchases widgets at $1.00 per unit and the market drops to $.50 per 
unit, that is a risk the buyer assumed. The seller assumes a similar risk 
in the case of a rising market. Risk allocation is the very essence of 
contract. Without risk, there would be no profit; and with no profit, 
there would be no contracts. According to Dobbs, "The mistake rule 
protects the parties' risk allocations. . .. It says that there is no 
mistake of fact at all when the parties misestimate the future. . . . The 
main point is to respect the parties' own risk allocations."129 Mistake 
is not simply misjudgment. 
Mistake may be invoked alternatively as a ground for reforming 
a contract or for rescinding it. As discussed below, reforming a 
contract because of mistake is designed to produce the agreement the 
parties truly intended. The parties have a good agreement, if not 
properly expressed. Reformation works to enforce the agreement the 
parties intended. Rescission, on the other hand, calls the deal off. 
Rescission of an agreement because of mistake is grounded in the 
logic of contract law: the mistake may be of such a nature that the 
parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds, so there is no contract 
at all. Rescission is warranted if the parties thought they understood 
one another but did not, but is not warranted if all that is required is 
a better expression of the parties' intentions. A mistake in expression 
is to reformation what a mistake in basic assumptions is to rescis-
sion. l30 
"When a claim is made that a contract is voidable because it was 
induced by mistake, the most important factor in determining whether 
the claim shall be allowed is the mutuality of the mistake."131 If one 
party thought he was selling Whiteacre, and the other party thought 
he was buying Whiteacre, but in fact the subject matter of the 
negotiations turned out to be Suburbanacre, then both parties entered 
into the contract under the influence of the same mistake. Thus, 
129. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 11.2, at 717, 718. 
130. lDOBBS, supra note 4, § 4.3(7), at 618 
131. MCCLINfOCK, supra note 12, at 238. 
HeinOnline -- 74 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 642 1996-1997
642 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.74:609 
there is ordinarily no more fault on the part of one than on the part 
of the other, and the effect of the parties' contract is that there was 
no meeting of the minds. In such cases of mutual mistake, equity 
courts will grant relief much more freely by resting on basic principles 
of contract law than on loose principles of discretion. On the other 
hand, in cases where the mistake is unilateral, the contract reflects 
what one of the parties agreed to, suggesting negligence on the part 
of the other party. Equity courts are far more reluctant to grant relief 
in those cases. 
The easy cases involving mutual mistake come in two varieties: 
(1) those where the mistake concerns the very subject matter of the 
contract, and (2) those where the mistake involves a fact which did 
not in any respect induce formation of the contract. For example, a 
contract for the purchase of patent rights which both parties assumed 
were valid will be rescinded after it is discovered that the patents are 
void. The test of materiality of the mistake is that it must relate to a 
basic assumption of the parties on which the contract was made and 
which materially affects the agreed performances of the parties.132 
The famous "barren cow" case of Sherwood v. Walkd 33 is illustrative. 
In that case the parties agreed to the sale and purchase of a cow 
which was thought to be barren, but which was, in reality, with calf. 
When the seller discovered the fertile condition of the cow, he refused 
to deliver her. In permitting rescission, the Michigan Supreme Court 
stated, "[I] n the case made by this record ... the mistake or 
misapprehension of the parties went to the whole substance of the 
agreement. If the cow was a breeder, she was worth at least $750; if 
barren, she was not worth over $80."134 The Sherwood case thus 
distinguishes mistakes affecting the essence of the consideration from 
those which go to its quality or value, affording relief on a per se basis 
for the former but not the latter. 
An example of a mistake going to the quality or value of the 
subject matter of the a~eement can be found in A & M Land 
Development Co. v. Miller. 35 In that case, the parties agreed to the 
sale ofland which both parties thought could be lucratively developed 
but which in fact could not because necessary county permits could 
not be obtained. The plaintiff purchased 91 lots of real estate, but 
sought partial rescission when it could not develop 42 of the lots 
because it could not obtain county health department permits to 
install septic tanks. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to allow 
rescission because the mistake, whether mutual or unilateral, related 
132. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d at 207. 
133. See, e.g., 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
134. Id. at 922. 
135. See, e.g.,94 N.W.2d 197 (Mich. 1959). 
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only to the value of the property. The fact that the property was of 
less value than the buyer expected was not a sufficient basis for 
granting equitable relief. In short, the mistake, even though mutual, 
did not warrant rescission because it did not affect the essence of the 
agreement. 
The hard cases are the ones in between, where the mistake does 
not go to the very subject matter of the contract but which did serve 
as an inducement to the formation of the agreement. The Michigan 
Supreme Court attempted to cut this Gordian knot in Lenawee County 
Board of Health v. Messerly.,s6 The Court adopted the position of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contractsl37 that even in those cases where 
a mutual mistake of fact exists that relates to a basic assumption of the 
parties, and which materially affects the agreed performances of the 
parties, rescission is nevertheless unavailable if the party seeking 
rescission on the ground of mistake has assumed the risk of loss in 
connection with the mistake. '38 In the Messerly case, a defective 
septic tank made the premises that were the subject of a land 
purchase agreement unsuitable for human habitation. A basic 
assumption of the parties' agreement was that the premises could be 
utilized to generate rental income. That assumption was frustrated. 
The Court nevertheless denied rescission, holding that as between two 
innocent parties the purchasers were not entitled to rescission because 
they had assumed the risk of loss by accepting an "as is" clause in the 
purchase agreement. 139 Because the contract had allocated this 
particular risk of loss to the purchaser, and the Court refused to upset 
the parties' bargain. 
Finally, a mistake of law is generally not a ground for equitable 
relief. 140 In addition, there can be no relief in the case of a "unilat-
eral" mistake, that is, a mistaken assumption by one of the parties in 
the course of contract formation of which the other party is unaware. 
However, where such knowledge of the other's mistake is present, the 
contract will be rescinded and restitution granted on a theory of 
fraudulent concealment. 141 
136. 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1982). 
137. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 152 (1981). 
138. See Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1982). 
139. [d. at 210. 
140. See Bomarko, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 525 N.W.2d 518 (Mich. 1994), appeal 
denied, 539 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. 1995). 
141. See, e.g., Windham v. Morris, 121 N.W.2d 479 (1963) (holding that purchasers 
of real property not entitled to relief when they learned one year later that hus-
band/seller had placed a lower value on property in his divorce suit than they had 
been told); See also II GEORGE PALMER, THE LAw OF REsTITUTION § 12.3 (1978). 
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4. Generally, What is Reformation, and When is It Appropriate 
to Reform the Parties' Agreement? 
Reformation is the judicial rewriting of a document to make it 
reflect the agreement the parties actually reached. The purpose of 
reformation is not to make a new contract for the parties, but rather 
to correctly express the contract they made. Reformation may be 
granted in cases of mistake or misrepresentation.142 Indeed, refor-
mation, and not rescission, is the only appropriate remedy for 
misrepresentation or mistake when a writing fails to reflect the parties' 
actual agreement. Conversely, if the parties failed to reach an 
agreement due to misrepresentation or mistake, then the appropriate 
remedy is rescission, not reformation. 143 Fraud or mistake in the 
expression of the parties' agreement warrants reformation, not 
rescission, because rescission would deny one of the parties the benefit 
of the bargain actually made. On the other hand, fraud or mistake in 
the formation of an agreement warrants rescission, not reformation, 
because granting reformation in such cases would result in the 
imposition on the parties of a bargain that neither agreed to. In some 
cases, neither reformation nor rescission is the appropriate remedy; 
rather, specific performance of the agreement as written is the correct 
remedy. The plaintiff does not have the option: the three remedies 
are mutually exclusive, and only one of them will correctly reflect the 
parties' agreement or the absence of it. 
Because requests for reformation seek to alter what the parties 
have reduced to writing, the potential for undoing the parties' real 
bargain, as well as the threat to contract stability, is real. Consequent-
ly, in order to avoid making a new contract for the parties, not only 
must fraud and mistake be pleaded with particularity,l44 proof of 
fraud or mistake must be clear and convincing.145 The uniform 
requirement of a burden of proof higher than the customary proo£.by-
a-preponderance standard in civil litigation reflects ajudicial suspicion 
that the reformation remedy may be used to avoid a performance 
obligation. In the words of the Michigan Supreme Court, "Courts are 
required to proceed 'with utmost caution in exercising jurisdiction to 
142. See. e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Norris, 109 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. 
1961). 
143. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 9.5, at 614-15. 
144. MICH. Gr. R 2.112(B). 
145. SeeWoolnerv. Layne, 181 N.W.2d 907 (Mich. 1970); See also Progressive Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 193 N.W.2d 54 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (to obtain reformation, 
plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a mutual and common 
mistake was made by both parties). 
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reform written instruments."I46 One party's word against that of the 
other ordinarily fails to satisfy the burden of proof for reformation. 
Reformation actions often are "swearing matches." Corroborative 
evidence supporting the assertions of the party seeking reformation is 
necessary. 14 
Neither the parol evidence rule nor the presence of a merger 
clause in the parties' agreement will prevent the plaintiff from 
showing that the writing is not in fact the one agreed upon and that 
it does not express the parties' contract. l48 Similarly, provided a 
writing exists that satisfies the formalities of the statute of frauds, the 
terms of that writin~ can be reformed to correct a mistake in the 
parties' expression. 14 However, the defenses common to all claims 
seeking equitable relief, unclean hands, laches, and estoppel, apply 
equally to claims for reformation. 
a. When is Mistake a Proper Ground For Reforming a 
Document? 
When parties reach agreement, reduce that agreement to writing, 
but vvrite it down in a way that materially departs from their actual 
agreement, reformation beckons. "The mistake for which the relief 
of reformation is available must be a mistake in the expression of the 
actual agreement of the parties not a mistake entering into the 
agreement."150 A condition precedent to the remedy of reformation 
is a valid agreement between the parties which the document they 
executed fails to express correctly. The mistake must be mutual, that 
is, the parties must have agreed to the same terms and have mistaken-
ly assumed that those terms were properly expressed in the docu-
ment. 151 Nevertheless, if the mistake is not mutual, reformation may 
still be granted where the unilateral mistake is coupled with knowl-
edge of the mistake by the other party who fails to disclose the error 
(thus making unilateral mistake a species of estoppel).152 
The mistake must be one of substance and of fact, and not one 
of law. 153 However, one Michigan case finessed the rule that refor-
mation is not permitted for mistakes of law but characterizing such 
146. Theophelis v. Lansing General Hospital, 424 N.W.2d 478,486 (Mich. 1988). 
147. ROBERT N. LEAVELL,JEAN C. LOVE, GRANT S. NELSON & CANDACE S. KOVACIC-
FLEISCHER, EQUITABLE REMEDIES, REsrITUTION AND DAMAGES 901 (5th ed. 1994) 
[hereinafter LEAVELL]. 
148. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 9.6, at 623; See generally George Palmer, Reformation 
and the Parol Evidence Rule, 65 MICH. L. REv. 833 (1967). 
149. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 12, at 276-77. 
150. [d. § 95 at 256. 
151. [d. § 96 at 259. 
152. See Barryton State Sav. Bank v. Durkee, 37 N.W.2d 892 (Mich. 1949). 
153. See Burns v. Caskey, 58 N.W. 642 (Mich. 1894). 
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mistakes as a "mutual mistake as to the legal import and meaning of 
the technical words.,,154 
An illustration of when reformation for mistake is appropriate is 
the scrivener's error: the agreement reads "95 acres," when it should 
have read "9.5 acres." With the exception of wills, almost any 
document can be reformed-conveyances, negotiable instruments, 
releases, insurance policies, and other contracts.I55 On the other 
hand, as noted, if the mistake is one of formation, not expression, 
then rescission may be the proper remedy, but not reformation. For 
example, if a builder by mistake submits a bid too low because he 
omitted a cost item, he might have the bid rescinded; but he cannot 
get reformation and have a higher-priced contract foisted on the 
owner. Reformation corrects mutual errors; it does not create new 
obligations. 
h. When is Misrepresentation a Proper Ground for 
Reforming a Document? 
Where one of the parties to a transaction has misrepresented to 
the other that a provision to which the parties agreed has been 
incorporated in the agreement, or represents that the document 
properly expresses the parties' agreement, the document may be 
reformed. Reformation may be granted for fraud or misrepresenta-
tion as a way of requiring the party responsible for the misconduct to 
make his representations good. However, where the fraud or 
misrepresentation affects the terms of the actual agreement between 
the parties, then rescission, not reformation, is the proper remedy. 
c. Is Unfairness or Disparity in the Overall Bargain a 
Proper Ground for Reforming a Contract? 
As previously noted, the short answer to this question is "no." 
Outside of the largely unexplored innovation of the unconscionability 
provision of Section 2-302(1) of the vee/56 there is scant authority 
for reforming a contract found to be unreasonably costly to one of the 
parties by altering the consideration to make it "fairer.,,157 
154. Scott v. Grow, 3 N.W.2d 254 (Mich. 1942). 
155. 2 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 11.6(1), at 745. 
156. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 440.2302 (West 1994), provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application 
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
157. PALMER, supra note 141, at § 13.9, at 55-60; LEAVELL, supra note 147, at 911. 
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5. What are the General Principles a Court Should Follow When 
Asked to Order Injunctive Relief? 
647 
An injunction is "the strong arm of equity."I58 An injunction is 
an order issuing from a court addressed to the defendant and 
commanding the defendant to refrain from doing, or commanding 
him to perform, a certain act. Injunctions are thus divided into two 
kinds: prohibitory and mandatory. They are further classified by the 
stage in the proceedings when the injunction is issued and its 
duration: provisional (before a full hearing on the merits) 159 and 
permanent (after an adjudication on the merits). The Michigan 
legislature has enacted a host of statutes dealing with the issuance of 
injunctions under specific circumstances. 160 
Certain basic principles govern the grant or refusal of an 
injunction. An i~junction is an extraordinary remedy the issuance of 
which rests in the sound discretion of the court.161 An injunction 
should not be issued automatically. On the contrary, at the threshold 
the circuit court's initial decision to exercise its injunctive powers must 
be guided by the utmost discretion and reserve. Of all the equitable 
remedies, the injunction is the one which needs to be approached 
with the greatest degree of caution, deliberation, and sound discre-
tion. This is true for the simple reason that to issue an injunction 
erroneously in a doubtful case will inflict irreparable injury on the 
enjoined party. Accordingly, the extraordinary relief of an injunction 
must be used "sparingly, cautiously and only ... where both the right 
and the wrong claimed are clear and the necessity for the extraordi-
nary relief of injunction is equally clear.,,162 
158. Bonaparte v. Camden, 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D.NJ. 1830) (No. 1617). 
159. Two types of provisional injunctions are the preliminary injunction and the 
temporary restraining order that is issued without notice in exigent circumstances to 
prevent immediate and irreparable injury, such as the imminent razing of an historical 
building. 
160. For a list of citations to Michigan statutes authorizing and prohibiting 
irUunctions in particular proceedings, see lOA CALLAGHAN'S MICH. PL. & PRAC. § 76.06, 
at 342-43 & n.1 (2d ed. 1991). The procedure for issuing temporary restraining 
orders and preliminary injunctions is governed by MICH. Cr. R. 3.310. By statute, 
jurisdiction is expressly conferred on the circuit court to enjoin a private nuisance. 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.2940 (West 1986). A plaintiff who prevails in a private 
nuisance action may obtain both damages and abatement. Injunctions against public 
nuisances is also expressly authorized by MICH. Cr. R. 3.601. Similar statutory 
provision is made for enjoining threatening and continuing trespass to land. See 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.2919 (West 1986). 
161. Azzar V. Primebank, FSB, 499 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
162. Sharp V. Lucky, 266 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1959). 
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a. Irreparable Injury and No Adequate Remedy at Law 
Two prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction are that the 
plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction and that 
the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Although irreparable 
injury is listed as a separate prerequisite, in the context of the issuance 
of an injunction, irreparable injury and no adequate remedy at law 
have the same meaning. If the iJtiury can be compensated by 
damages, then the iJtiury is not irreparable.163 If it cannot be so 
compensated, then the injury is deemed irreparable. 1M In cases 
where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, the irreparable 
injury must be real and the harm imminent. Moreover, in the context 
of preliminary injunctions, the irreparable harm requirement acts as 
a socially useful barrier to the issuance of an equitable remedy in a 
case where there has not yet been a trial on the merits. 
There is no general formula for determining when a legal remedy 
is inadequate. In recalling the history of the adequacy rule, it 
becomes readily apparent that the original reasons for the require-
ment have little to do with today's cases. Before the merger of law 
and equity into a unitary system, equity courts would utter the self-
serving statement, before granting equitable relief, that the plaintiff 
had no adequate remedy at law, and therefore equity was stepping in 
to fill the remedial void. By declaring that the plaintiff had no 
adequate remedy at law, the equity courts were demonstrating that 
they were not stepping over their jurisdictional boundaries by 
usurping the jurisdiction of the law courts. Today, with the merger of 
law and equity in a single court, an equity court need not be 
concerned with overstepping jurisdictional lines. Nevertheless, the 
adequate remedy at law and irreparable iJtiury requirements still serve 
an important core policy of preferring legal remedies over injunctive 
remedies when a choice exists. This preference exists for the simple 
reason that injunctions are coercive, whereas legal remedies are 
noncoercive. Injunctions are a direct infringement on a defendant's 
liberty and autonomy. They command personal conduct and can 
require defendants to engage in affirmative conduct. Unlike money 
judgments, iJtiunctions are enforceable by contempt proceedings 
which threaten the disobedient defendant with imprisonment. 
Although the adequate remedy at law prerequisite is not well 
defined, four generalizations are possible. The plaintiff's legal remedy 
163. Ainsworth v. Munoskong Hunting & Fishing Club, 116 N.W. 992, 994 (Mich. 
1908). 
164. Id. 
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is usually deemed inadequate in the following situations:I65 
1. The plaintiff seeks recovery of something that is unique, such 
as the conveyance of a parcel of land. 
2. The defendant engages in repeated and continuous wrongful 
acts, such as a nuisance or trespass to land.I66 
3. The plaintiff could recover a money judgment from the 
defendant, but the judgment is uncollectible because the defendant 
is insolvent. I67 
4. Damages cannot be measured with reasonable certainty, such 
as lost sales or profits due to the defendant's infringement of the 
plaintiff's intellectual property (e.g., trade secrets or customer lists). 
As noted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, Traditional equity 
principles are a circuit court's guide to whether injunctive reliefis Just 
and proper.'168 One of the most important guides to the exercise 
of an equity court's discretion, and a serious policy consideration as 
well, is that when asked to grant an injunction the court must consider 
whether it will be involved in constant oversight of the performance 
of complex or continuing acts, such as the completion of a construc-
tion project. 169 New disputes may arise that could sap judicial 
resources, counseling against the issuance of injunctions in such 
circumstances. This concern has particular force in cases involving 
injunctions that attempt to reorganize social institutions. Courts 
should take great care to ensure that the time to administer and 
enforce an injunction does not become an administrative burden.170 
h. Preliminary Injunctions 
Michigan employs the traditional four-prong test to determine 
whether a preliminary injunction should issue: (1) harm to the public 
interest if an injunction issues; (2) whether harm to the applicant in 
the absence of an injunction outweighs the harm to the opposing 
165. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 2.5(2), at 130-31. 
166. See, e.g., Davis v. Frankenlust Twp., 76 N.W. 1045 (Mich. 1898). See also 
MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. § 600.2919(3) (West 1996), providing for the issuance of 
injunctions in cases of continuing trespass. 
167. See, e.g., White Star Refining Co. v. Hansen, 231 N.W. 577 (Mich. 1930). 
168. Local 229, AFSCME v. City of Detroit, 335 N.W.2d 695, 696-97 (Mich. Ct. 
App.1983). 
169. Bradfield v. Dewell, 11 N.W. 760 (Mich. 1882). See also Edelen v. W.B. 
Samuels & Co. 103 S.W. 360 (Ky. Ct. App. 1907), where the court refused to grant 
specific performance of a contract calling for the sale to plaintiff of the output of a 
distillery for five years because the order would require the court to supervise the 
business during that time to assure that it was being honored. 
170. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARy KAy KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at 55 (1995). 
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party if an injunction is granted;l7l (3) the strength of the appli-
cant's demonstration that the applicant is likely to prevail on the 
merits; and (4) demonstration that the applicant will suffer irreparable 
injury if a preliminary injunction is not granted.172 
The difficulty with the traditional four-factor analysis is that it 
does not tell the court what weight to place on each of the factors nor 
what kind of estimates the court is to make with each one. By citing 
one or more of the four factors and invoking equitable" discretion" to 
reach a decision on the request for injunctive relief, a court can neatly 
avoid analysis. The policies that bear on the propriety of granting a 
preliminary injunction are taken into account in this four-prong test, 
even if those policies are not explicitly explained by it. Of the four 
factors, clearly the plaintiff's probability of success on the merits, 
coupled with the respective harms to the plaintiff and defendant in 
the event an injunction is or is not granted, are the two most 
important.173 A court that is asked to issue a preliminary injunction 
must be sensitive to the potential harm an erroneous injunction could 
cause the defendant. The judge should grant or deny preliminary 
relief with the possibility in mind that an error might cause irrepara-
ble loss to either party. The judge should, therefore, estimate the 
magnitude of that loss on each side as well as the risk of error.174 
For example, risk factors that the court should carefully consider 
before issuing an iryunction include the possibility of undue intrusion 
and coercion, the possibility that the contempt power might have to 
be invoked, and the disruption of alternative dispute resolution 
processes that might dispose of the suit without the need for judicial 
intervention. In sum, even if the plaintiff has a very good chance of 
success on the merits, a preliminary injunction should not issue if on 
balance it will cause more harm to the defendant than good to the 
plaintiff. For example, if a defendant mistakenly and in good faith 
built a garage that encroaches on plaintiff's land, a court should 
inquire whether the plaintiff is using a request for iryunctive relief to 
exact extortion. 
171. Jeffrey v. Lathrup, 108 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1961); Grand Haven Twp. v. 
Brummel, 274 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). 
172. State Employees Ass'n v. Dep't of Mental Health, 365 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Mich. 
1984); Campau v. McMath, 463 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); City of 
Detroit v. Salaried Physicians Professional Ass'n, UAW, 418 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1987); M & S, Inc. v. Attorney General, 418 N.W.2d 441,444 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1987). 
173. Of course, the public interest factor can be a weighty consideration in cases 
involving a strike by public employees, or in cases involving a public nuisance that is 
causing widespread polIution. 
174. SeeJohn Leubsdorf, The Standardf(JT Preliminary Injunctions, 91 lIARv. L. REv. 
525 (1978). 
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In connection with this last point, a court that is asked to grant 
a preliminary injunction must always remain mindful of the risk of an 
erroneous legal decision. At the preliminary injunction stage of 
litigation, the court must make a best guess as to plaintiff's likelihood 
of success on the merits. Even after a full trial on the merits, the 
court may still be wrong despite its best efforts to find truth and 
achieve justice. An erroneous injunction might be especially harmful 
to the defendant, while offering no corresponding benefit to the 
plaintiff. The court must carefully consider whether the cost or 
hardship to the defendant that an injunction will impose sufficiently 
outw'eighs the benefit to which the plaintiff is entitled. 
6. Generally, What are the Restitutionary Remedies Available 
from an Equity Court? 
Together with the equitable remedies of specific performance, 
rescission, reformation, and injunctions, restitution rounds out the 
available remedies from an equity court. Although at its core the 
remedy of restitution is designed to prevent unjust enrichment, 
restitution had separate and distinct developments in the law courts 
and the equity courts. On the law side, the restitutionary remedies 
include ejectment, replevin, and pecuniary actions based on quasi-
contract. But the law courts required that a plaintiff seeking 
restitution in property cases have legal title to the property. As a 
consequence, an ejectment or replevin claim was of no help to a 
plaintiff without good title at law to the property in question. Equity 
filled this remedial gap through the legal fiction that it did not decide 
title but acted on the person of the defendant. 
The four major restitutionary remedies in equity are: (1) the 
constructive trust, (2) the equitable lien, (3) subrogation, and (4) the 
accounting for profits. The last three restitutionary remedies are 
closely related to the constructive trust. In the case of a constructive 
trust, the defendant has legal title to property that rightfully belongs 
to the plaintiff over which the court imposes a constructive trust, 
makes the defendant a "constructive trustee," and orders the 
defendant to transfer title to the plaintiff as the true owner. The 
equitable lien uses similar concepts to give the plaintiff a security 
interest in all or a portion of property held by the defendant. In 
subrogation cases the plaintiff seeks restitution by standing in the 
shoes of and pursuing the rights of another person. The accounting 
for profits takes the constructive trust remedy and applies it to 
property that produces profits or income. An equity court carefully 
chooses the restitutionary remedy that is appropriate under the 
particular circumstances of a case, calibrating the remedy to the 
vvrong. 
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a. When Should an Equity Court Impose a Constructive 
Trust on Property Held by a Defendant? 
In constructive trust cases, where the defendant by fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence induced the plaintiff to 
convey property to her, the court will rescind the contract, declare 
that the defendant holds the property in constructive trust for the 
plaintiff, and order a reconveyance of the property to the plaintiff. 175 
When an equity court imposes a constructive trust upon an asset held 
by the defendant, the court is not in fact creating a trust but rather a 
remedy that is analogous to a trust. 176 The plaintiff ultimately 
recovers legal title to the very property identified as being subject to 
the constructive trust, not merely a money judgment equal to the 
value of the asset. Although specific restitution is also available at law, 
such restoration comes in replevin or ejectment actions where the 
plaintiff holds legal title to the property. 
b. When Should an Equity Court Place an Equitable Lien 
on Property Held by a Defendant? 
An equitable lien is essentially a special form of a constructive 
trust. The lien is imposed for the same reasons as those for imposing 
a constructive trust. The difference is that the constructive trust gives 
the plaintiff complete title to the property, whereas the equitable lien 
only gives the plaintiff a security interest in the property that he can 
foreclose upon and use the proceeds of which to satisfy a money 
claim. An equitable lien is frequently used as a device for tracing 
money belonging to the plaintiff that the defendant improperly 
obtained and used to purchase property.177 For example, if the 
defendant owned a lot and used money improperly obtained from the 
plaintiff to build a house, the plaintiff would have an equitable lien (a 
security interest) on the house, but he would not have title to the 
house and the lot as well, as would be the case with a constructive 
trust. The constructive trust gives the plaintiff title to specific 
property, while the equitable lien only attaches to the property as 
security. However, both of these restitutionary remedies require that 
particular assets, or assets traceable to the original property, be 
identified as belonging to the plaintiff. 
175. See, e.g., Herpolsheimer v. A.B. Herpolsheimer Realty Co., 75 N.W.2d 333 
(Mich. 1956); Laude v. Cossins, 55 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 1952); Burton v. Burton, 51 
N.W.2d 297 (Mich. 1952). 
176. In re Estate of Swantek, 432 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
177. Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 161 N.W.2d 133, 138 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968). 
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c. When Should an Equity Court Permit a Plaintiff to Seek 
Subrogation? 
653 
Subrogation simply means substitution of one person for a 
creditor, so that the former succeeds to the rights of the creditor in 
relation to the debtor. Subrogation is appropriate in any case where 
restitution is warranted to prevent unjust enrichment because one 
person has paid the debt of another. Although subrogation can be 
required by contract, the inquiry here is subrogation to prevent unjust 
enrichment.178 Under equitable, as opposed to contractual, subroga-
tion, the plaintiff essentially receives an assignment of all the rights 
and remedies the creditor possessed against the defendant-debtor, 
subject to all the defenses the defendant has against the creditor. 
Unlike an ordinary assignment which is contractual, this equitable 
assignment occurs by operation of law through the court. 
Subrogation cases typically arise in cases involving sureties and 
insurers. 179 For example, when a surety guarantees repayment of a 
promissory note in the event a borrower defaults on a loan, and the 
surety does in fact pay the borrower's debt upon the latter's default, 
the surety steps into the lender's shoes and acquires the lender's right 
to enforce the promissory note against the borrower. 
d. When Should an Equity Court Order an Accounting far 
Profits? 
An accounting for profits is a restitutionary remedy to prevent 
unjust enrichment by a fiduciary. The reason why an accounting is an 
equitable remedy, even though it so closely resembles an action for 
damages for breach of contract, is purely historical. The history of the 
accounting remedy in equity developed in cases where the accounts 
were complex and, therefore, beyond the ken of most jurors. Since 
no right to a jury trial exists in equitable proceedings, equity chancel-
lors proceeded, unencumbered by the jury system, to adjudicate 
accounts. ISO Generally, a fiduciary or trust relation must exist 
between the parties, not merely a debtor-creditor or buyer-seller 
relationship. The action reaches monies owed by the fiduciary to the 
plaintiff, including profits produced by property that rightfully belongs 
to the plaintiff, in cases where the plaintiff has been defrauded by the 
178. Smith v. Sprague, 222 N.W. 207 (Mich. 1928). 
179. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 393 N.W.2d 
475 (Mich. 1986), where the Court held that an excess insurer may sue a primary 
insurer as the equitable subrogee of an insured for the primary insurer's bad-faith 
failure to defend or settle a claim within policy limits. Id. at 483. 
180. For a brief history of equitable accounting in the context of the right to a 
jury trial, see Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
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defendant. In this respect it closely resembles a constructive trust. 
An equity court assumes jurisdiction to enforce a claim for an 
accounting of profits where there exists an equitable duty to account 
on the part of a fiduciary. Typical examples of where an accounting 
is an appropriate remedy include cases in which a corporate officer or 
director has misappropriated or misused property or assets belonging 
to the corporation, or when a partner has received money for which 
he has failed to properly account to the partnership. An accounting 
holds the defendant liable for profits, but not for damages. 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS - EXERCISING DISCRETION IN A 
DISCIPLINED WAY 
Reflecting on the history and origins of equity, in some respects 
it seems remarkable that it ever took root in American soil. In 16th 
century England it probably seemed normal that the chancellor-bishop 
could arbitrarily refuse enforcement of a petitioner's rights. Mter all, 
he was the king's delegate who gave relief as a matter of grace and 
discretion to subjects of the Crown, not citizens of the State. As 
members of a democratic society Americans possess rights under law 
which they have an equal right to enforce. As litigants they do not 
appear before a judge as humble supplicants hoping to receive the 
judge's indulgence. As parties to a lawsuit they have a reasonable 
expectation that their claims won't be rejected on grounds that cannot 
be articulated in a principled way. It is probably asking too much to 
insist on perfection in the administration of equitable remedies. But 
citizens have a legitimate expectation that their claims will be disposed 
of according to traditional American jurisprudence that treats all 
similarly circumstanced litigants in a similar manner. 
What is the appropriate role of discretion when a judge is asked 
to grant an equitable remedy? Although there is no pat answer to that 
question, some general conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing 
discussion of equitable principles, remedies, and defenses. Discretion 
in equity is not the personal discretion of the judge, as was so with the 
Chancellor. Rather, it is a sound judicial discretion that is governed 
by the settled rules of equity. Understood in this light, equitable 
discretion is in fact equitable restraint. For example,judges sitting in 
equity do not possess. unlimited discretion in any case. On the 
contrary, in many situations the right to equitable relief is well 
established and granting such relief is routine. For example, specific 
performance of a contract to convey land is routinely granted, even 
though the remedy is concededly equitable in nature. 
By the same token, in cases where the court finds that an 
equitable defense has been established, that defense will bar equitable 
remedies, but not legal ones as well. Although a judge may have the 
discretion to deny equitable relief in appropriate circumstances as 
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determined by equity precedents and practice, that discretion does not 
extend to denying a plaintiff all relief, legal and equitable, regardless 
of the circumstances. An example from Professor Dobbs illustrates the 
point: "Discretion to deny legal relief would mean that the judge 
might refuse to permit recovery of personal injury damages to a 
pedestrian struck down in a crosswalk on the ground that she was on 
her way to an illicit rendezvous and would not have been injured had 
she stayed home with her family."181 
Many would applaud equity for its flexibility to award individual-
ized justice. But a legal system of open-ended discretion with no 
standards is an open invitation for judges to reach decisions based on 
nothing more than their attitudes, predilections, and biases, without 
analysis and the constraints of legal rules and principles. Good 
intentions do not guarantee good results. Without a commonly 
agreed upon set of rules in place to guide their decision making, 
judges may achieve individualized justice. They will at the same time, 
however, frustrate the development of any sense of community that 
flows from a shared set of rules and a common understanding as to 
what our rights are in a particular case. Individualized justice may 
please a specific litigant, but it makes predictability and planning 
impossible. Individualized justice will not reflect community standards 
developed through the adjudicative process and reflected in prece-
dent. With individualized justice precedent is not relied on to reach 
the case at hand and no precedent is created for future cases. The 
past, present, and future are divorced from each other. 
The exercise of a judge's personal discretion may reveal an 
unsuspected truth in the occasional case. But when a judge exercises 
his personal discretion, the protection that the rule of law gives us 
from erroneous decisions or decisions that are the product of 
improper motives vanishes. When a judge exercises his personal 
discretion, his mental processes are hidden and the decision-making 
process is no longer transparent. When a judge is compelled to 
anchor his decisions in rules and principles, the opportunity for 
corruption is mitigated. 
A judge attempting to factor the role of discretion into the 
equitable relief equation would do well to remember the origins of 
equity and equitable discretion. As Dobbs reminds us: "Discretion of 
the chancellor originated in a society where authority counted for 
more than democracy, and the wishes of the powerful for more than 
their explanations.,,182 When a judge invokes discretion as the basis 
for his ruling, he in effect is tossing a wild card on the table and using 
181. 1 DOBBS, supra note 4, § 2.4(2), at 94. 
182. Id. § 2.4(1), at 92. 
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it to mean whatever he needs it to mean. Discretion makes possible 
decisions that are unanalyzed and unexplained, which are not the 
kind of decisions we expect or accept in a society ruled by law. 
No system of jurisprudence can escape completely the curse of 
discretion. Courts that are asked to grant legal remedies are no less 
immune from the disease of discretion than courts sitting in equity. In 
the end, the integrity and wisdom of judges necessarily becomes 
relevant. Wisdom should tell a judge that when she grounds her 
decision-making process in well-articulated principles, doctrines, and 
rules, and in a long line of precedent, such a process holds far more 
promise of avoiding the use of personal discretion than does a system 
that turns a blind eye to the past. It is only through a fairly close 
adherence to principles, rules, and precedent that the goal of treating 
similar cases in a similar manner can be realized. And it is only then 
that modem equity can put some distance between itself and a system 
of justice where relief is measured by the length of the judge's foot. 
